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Race and Sex in Latin America

PETER WADE

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Map of Latin America

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INTRODUCTION: DEFINING RACE AND SEX

After working on 'race' in Brazil and France in the 1950s, the French sociologist Roger Bastide wrote an article in which he posed the question of why, during his research, 'the question race always provoked the answer sex' (Bastide 1961). The French sociologist Etienne Balibar put it a little differently when he stated that 'racism always presupposes sexism' (1991: 49), while the US sociologist Joane Nagel thinks that 'sex is the whispered subtext in spoken racial discourse', and more generally that 'ethnic boundaries are also sexual boundaries' (2003: 2, 1). In his study of British colonialism, the historian Ronald Hyam concluded that 'sex is at the very heart of racism' (1990: 203), while the Martinican psychiatrist and revolutionary writer Frantz Fanon, writing from the point of view of the colonised, said: 'If one wants to understand the racial situation psychoanalytically ... considerable importance must be given to sexual phenomena. In the case of the Jew, one thinks of money and its cognates. In the case of the Negro, one thinks of sex' (1986 [1952]: 160). And just in case one might conclude that the racist image of 'the Jew' plays only on the theme of money, Gilman shows that sexual imaginings and theories were key to the nineteenth-century racial category of 'Jew' and played an important role in the way Freud constructed his theories of femininity (1993: ch. 1).

From a variety of perspectives and over a long period, analysts have noted that situations that involve 'race' also often involve 'sex'. The opposite may not necessarily be the case; that is, it is less often averred that when people think about sex they automatically think about race or that racism is 'at the very heart' of sexism,

but various scholars do argue that sexual and gender categories have been historically formed in relation to racial ones. Bederman (1995), for example, contends that notions of (white, 'civilised') manliness in the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States were shaped in relation to the image of ('uncivilised') black and native American men; and McClintock (1995) argues that notions about gender and sex in imperial Britain were inextricably linked to ideas about race and empire – women might be seen as 'primitives', for example, and analogous to the 'primitives races' in the colonies.

In this book, I explore why these two domains are so closely related. I look at how they 'intersect', as the current terminology often has it, or, to put it in a slightly different way, how they 'mutually constitute' each other; that is, how they come into being in relation to and through each other, thus avoiding the assumption that each domain already exists fully formed and then 'intersects' with the other (not to mention 'intersections' with other domains or vectors, such as class and age). I am also interested in why racially hierarchical social orders, which are rooted in the control and exploitation of (racially identified) peoples and places, including associated lands and resources, also generate complex dynamics of hate and love, fear and fascination, contempt and admiration – in a word, ambivalence, an ambivalence that seems to have a specifically sexual dimension.

My focus in all this is principally on Latin America, mainly because this region's history offers a particular social order in which race and sex relate to each other in interesting ways. Many areas in Latin America experienced intensive processes of 'race mixture' – sexual and cultural interactions between Europeans, indigenous peoples and Africans. Not only was this mixture arguably more pervasive and frequent than in most other areas colonised by Europeans, but from the nineteenth century it also became – albeit unevenly – a symbol for national identities in the region in the shape of a recognition and sometimes a glorification of *mestizaje* (Spanish) or *mestiçagem* (Portuguese), both words deriving from the colonial terms *mestizo* (and *mestiço*), meaning a person born to parents of, for example, European and African

or European and indigenous American origins.[1] Countries such as Brazil and Mexico vaunted their mixed origins as the distinctive feature of their national populations and cultures; other countries might recognise their mixed roots without necessarily glorifying them; yet others might play down their African and indigenous roots in favour of a more European image (Appelbaum et al. 2003; Graham 1990; Miller 2004; Wade 1997). In this way, sexual relations between people perceived as being of a different racial origin became a 'foundational fiction' for nations in much of the region (Sommer 1991). Recognising and even glorifying mixture, often located in the past, did not by any means translate into respecting or valuing current indigenous and black peoples: racism could easily coexist with *mestizaje* (Hale 1996; Telles 2004; Wade 1993a, 1997). From the 1960s, indigenous and black rights movements burgeoned and, in the 1990s, many countries enacted constitutional reforms and legal measures designed to create or recognise multicultural nations: this created a changed context for thinking about *mestizaje*: do race and sex relate in new ways in an officially multicultural nation? Despite this fascinating history and contemporary conjuncture, the question of race and sex in Latin America remains relatively understudied, although there is a growing literature on the theme.[2]

Definitions

Given that the terms race, sex and gender are, in the context of current social theory, contested and not clear-cut, it makes sense to give a brief outline of how I understand and use them in this book, which does not mean to say I shall give neat and watertight definitions of each concept.

Race

'Race' is a difficult concept, the definition of which I have written on at some length elsewhere (Wade 1993b, 1997: 6–15; 2002b: 1–16). The key problem centres on balancing change and continuity. The element of change derives from the fact that the

term emerged in European languages between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries to refer to different lineages of people and human diversity (Stolcke 1994: 276). It underwent successive transformations until it reached what many regard as its apogee in the mid-nineteenth century, when the concept became central to thinking about human and social diversity within the framework of social theory and the natural and medical sciences; 'race' was, then, a natural human fact which explained a huge amount about why and how human diversity existed and legitimated a hierarchy in which white Europeans dominated. Then, from the early to mid-twentieth century, the concept declined in importance as a perceived physical 'fact' and became mainly, but not exclusively, understood as an idea, a 'social construct', with no basis in biology, but which has enduring social power in its ability to generate racism, a set of practices and attitudes which discriminate against certain categories of people, not necessarily now defined in terms of their physical natures, but often in terms of their cultures: hence the term 'cultural racism'. With all this historical variation, there is inevitably debate about when 'race' properly speaking emerged: some people date it from the sixteenth century (or even earlier), others prefer to focus on the seventeenth, eighteenth or even nineteenth century as being the true era for the origins of 'race'.

The element of continuity perceived to exist in 'race' derives from the fact that, through all these changes – or perhaps only through some of them – we are faced with varied phenomena that, if not the same, at least seem to bear a 'family resemblance', to use Wittgenstein's term. Race always seems to refer to human difference understood as 'natural' (bearing in mind that concepts of nature have also been historically very varied) and as often related in one way or another to certain aspects of physical appearance, to traits that are transmitted, albeit unevenly and often unpredictably, from one generation to another by sexual reproduction and the transmission of a substance or essence, often glossed as 'blood'. Because of this, the concept of race is often defined in terms of a combination of references to biology, physical appearance (skin colour, etc.), nature, heredity or an internal natural essence of some kind. In this respect, a distinction is often made between race and 'ethnicity', with the latter understood in the social sciences as referring to culture, history and origins of a non-biological, non-natural kind.

A different basis for continuity or common ground is the fact that racial distinctions are often said to emerge with the European discovery and domination through colonialism of other areas of the world. Racial distinctions emerge from the attempt by Europeans to classify and control non-Europeans, albeit these distinctions built on some of those developed by the ancient Greeks and current in Europe before colonialism. 'Race' is thus tied to a specific history of the world, rather than simply being specified by the type of naturalising discourse it uses. The key racial categories have somehow remained remarkably similar, albeit with changing terminologies, subcategories and overlaps: black (originating in Africa), white (originating in Europe), 'Indian' (i.e. native American), Asian/Oriental and Aboriginal Australasian. People from Oceania (roughly Melanesia, Micronesia, Polynesia) are sometimes fitted into the Asian category and other times the Australasian one.[3] Perhaps not surprisingly, these categories correspond roughly to the classificatory system for the continents of the world – Africa, Europe, the Americas, Asia and Australia (and Antarctica) – a system also developed by Europeans.

I prefer an historically inclusive approach that recognises the historical continuities that underlie the variations. It seems to me vital to recognise the role of European domination that operated through classifications which, although they varied greatly in their character and theoretical underpinnings, consistently targeted the same categories of people and used similar types of rationales, and invoked some notion of 'nature' (itself a varying concept) that could be deployed to explain internal, invisible traits (e.g. moral qualities, intelligence, behaviour) and link them to external, visible traits (e.g. skin colour, skull form). I agree, broadly speaking, with the idea that race is a naturalising discourse, but I think it is essential to emphasise that 'naturalisation' is a practice, the effects of which vary according to the way 'nature' is understood.[4] I also think it is important to understand that 'race' does not stand in

a relation of opposition to 'ethnicity' (often seen as analogous to the supposedly clear-cut opposition of 'biology' to 'culture'): race works by linking human nature, which may be thought of during specific historical periods as 'biology', to culture. Ethnicity may also carry strongly naturalising connotations, in relation not only to heritage and genealogy, but also to how land, territory and landscape shape people and their cultures (Alonso 1994; Stolcke 1993; Wade 2007a).

Race, as I use it in this book, then, refers to all the practices and ideas that surround racial classifications and distinctions, as outlined above. I shall also employ the widely used term racialisation to refer to the way social phenomena and processes take on racial meanings and functions.

Sex, Sexuality and Gender

If one starts with dictionary definitions of these terms, 'sex' is simply the quality of being male or female. According to the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the focus on genital anatomy to create this bipartite division is 'recent', although Fausto-Sterling (2000) and Laqueur (1990) both suggest that, in the West, it was from the eighteenth century that anatomy became the vital domain in which to attempt the division of human beings into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes. 'Sex' can also mean the act of sexual intercourse (a twentieth-century meaning, as in 'to have sex'). 'Sexual', in the *OED*, means anything relating to sex, as defined above, or anything related to sex 'as concerned in generation [i.e. sexual reproduction] or in the processes connected with this'; it is also anything 'relative to the physical intercourse between the sexes or the gratification of sexual appetites'. 'Sexuality' dates, according to the *OED*, from the early eighteenth century as an isolated technical, scientific term referring to the simple presence of sexual reproduction in a species; by the later eighteenth century it comes to mean more broadly the quality of being sexual (as defined above) or having sexual feelings. In the twentieth century – mainly the latter half – it also comes to mean sexual identity based on the object of a person's sexual attractions

or desires. Thus emerges the plural 'sexualities', recognising that heterosexual desires are only one set in a very varied range of sexual desires. 'Gender', for the *OED*, is 'a euphemism' for sex, but it is acknowledged that in twentieth-century feminist usage, it refers to cultural distinctions between the sexes.[5]

The dictionary gives us the basis for a very open definition of 'sex' as anything pertaining to the fact of being sexed or having a sex and anything pertaining to the relationships between the sexes. Of course, the *OED* simply summarises Western usage and conceptions and tends to reproduce Western assumptions, so one would need to reject the definition of sex as being only *either* male *or* female, in order to cope with the phenomena of intersexuality (a term encompassing various ways of being biologically both male and female, without human intervention), transsexuality (which can be used to mean physically both male and female as a result of human intervention) and transgenderism (a more open term, which refers to a person who is not unambiguously assignable to either the male or the female gender). One would also have to be careful to avoid the *OED*'s blatantly heteronormative implication that 'sexual' things only occur between men and women, as this would exclude homosexuality or relegate it to a deviation from 'normal' heterosexual behaviour, a normative standard that gay, lesbian and queer theorists and activists have been struggling against for some decades. One can be 'sexual' without doing things directly related to sexual reproduction; indeed, it may well be the case that most sexual activity is not, and is not even intended to be, reproductive.

An openness of definition is, in one sense, useful. One might be tempted to go with a more hierarchical set of definitions (e.g. Karras 2005: 6), in which sex means biological (mainly but not only anatomical) difference; sexuality means emotions, feelings and especially erotic desires that emanate from the fact of having a sex and engaging in acts of sexual intercourse (in the broadest sense); and gender means the various cultural roles, attitudes, practices and meanings associated with a given biological sex. However, such a neat hierarchy will not work. Feminists in the 1960s and 1970s worked hard to emphasise the sex/gender

distinction, in which sex was simply the biological differences between men and women. The point was to minimise the role of biology and highlight the role of society and culture in shaping 'men' and 'women', so showing how the same basic biological infrastructure of sex could give rise to very varied cultural superstructures of gender – 'men' and 'women' were very different things in different cultures, not to mention the existence of 'third' sexes and genders, which were not easily placed as either male/man or female/woman (Herdt 1994). But from the mid-1980s, feminists began to question this distinction and point out how 'sex' itself is also shaped by culture and history: the very idea of the biological differences between men and women is wrapped up in the historical developments of medicine and science; the Western notion of a species divided into two opposed, exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories called males and females is not universal and is an historical notion even in the West (Butler 1990, 1993; Fausto-Sterling 1985, 2000; Laqueur 1990; Moore 1994). If sex itself is a cultural construct, then all the more so would be sexual emotions and desires, which cannot be seen as arising automatically from the mere fact of being female or male – as being determined by sex hormones, for example. The rise of LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender/sexual) activism in the 1980s and the emergence of queer theory in the 1990s added to this sense of sexuality as open, flexible and indeterminate.[6]

The view of sexuality as cultural construction was supported by the work of Michel Foucault, who saw sexuality (or, in his terminology, simply 'sex', as he uses the two terms more or less interchangeably) as a domain of knowledge that emerged as a major focus of concern, comment and especially scientific intervention from the eighteenth century and above all in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Foucault 1998 [1979]). Prior to this, the Church in particular had been concerned with sex and its regulation, but not in the same way as the medicalised and scientific discourse that now arose and that focused on sex as a way to regulate and administer the life-force of society as a whole. This view implied that, far from sexuality being a natural, universal force, the up-welling of which was subject to repressive

control by Victorian society, the European bourgeoisie developed a science of sexuality in which experts and scientists delved into sex, now understood as the key that could unlock the workings of people and society and a realm in which control, regulation and intervention were necessary: women's sexuality was linked to pathological hysteria; children's sexuality was seen as abnormal; masturbation undermined health. The Catholic practice of confession increasingly focused on sex, not just the act, but thoughts about it too, and psychoanalysis – a kind of secular confession – became an important technique for exploring, but also according to Foucault actually creating, sexuality as a key to personal identity. This kind of confessional practice became evident, beyond the psychoanalyst's couch, in the pervasive practice of people talking about their sexuality, although, as Giddens points out, there is a vast difference between the late nineteenth and the late twentieth centuries in terms of the openness and pervasiveness of talk about sexuality. This needs to be explained by institutional changes in society, which Foucault does not really consider, such as the separation of sex from reproduction which contraception permitted; the increasing autonomy of women; the diffusion of notions of romantic love as a key personal goal; and the development of selfhood as a kind of open-ended life project, in which sexuality is a key element (Giddens 1992: ch. 2).

If both sex and sexuality are cultural constructs and not simply natural phenomena, then they are both in the same boat as gender, and we cannot see sex or sexuality as a biological substratum overlain by the cultural elaboration of gender. Yet are they all the same thing? Some feminist thinkers in the 1980s seemed to think so and used sex/sexuality as an overarching concept which subsumed gender (Stanton 1995).[7] Clearly sex, sexuality and gender are closely connected; for example, the sexuality of men and women is often said to be tied to their sexual biology (genitalia, sex hormones, etc.) and male homosexuality has even been linked by some to a supposed 'gay gene'. In turn, gender roles and meanings attached to the categories of male and female are often closely linked to their sexuality. The idea that women are, or should be, domestic creatures, taking primary if not sole

responsibility for childrearing and running the domestic realm, is part and parcel of ideas about the protection of feminine 'honour' and sexual reputation. This 'cult of domesticity', as McClintock (1995) calls it, has played a major role in shaping women's role in the labour market, politics and the public realm generally in Western (and many other) societies. As the feminist slogan has it, 'The personal is political': what happens within the confines of the personal realm (the private, domestic sphere, including the bedroom) is also a political matter, which shapes aspects of public life. Similarly, when a man has sex with other men, what he does 'in the bedroom', if knowledge of it goes beyond the bedroom, historically has had a crucial influence on how he is perceived in the public realm.

However, there is still a case for maintaining a distinction of some kind between sex/sexuality and gender. After all, Foucault has been accused of writing a history of sexuality that was not attentive enough to gender – that is, how sexuality differed for men and women, or how discourses on sexuality helped produce gender distinctions (Hunt 1995; Stoler 1995: 93) – so it is clearly possible, if hazardous, to focus on one rather than the other. Moore (1994: 20) observes that while the concepts of sexual difference and gender difference 'collide ... and cannot usefully be separated', it is still the case that they 'cannot become identical'. From the 1990s, queer theory has also tended to drive sexuality and gender apart, wanting to retain a distinction between sexuality and gender, emphasising that the particularity of non-heterosexualities cannot be reduced to gender differences (Campbell 2000: 179). Elizabeth Weed states: 'queer theory ... has been consistent about one aspect of its project: consideration of sex and sexuality cannot be contained by the category of gender'. However, she goes on to say: 'The problem ... is that in this formulation gender becomes the property of feminist enquiry, while the proper study of sex and sexuality is located elsewhere', which, Weed argues, does an injustice to feminist theory (Weed 1997: viii).

The relationship between sex and gender is obviously problematic, but it is not quite the same to write a book about how race relates to gender as it is to write about how race relates to sexuality. The former project might look, for example, at research on racial and gender discrimination in the Brazilian labour market, research which generally does not include any mention of sexuality in terms of ideas, emotions and practices related to being male or female in the sexual sense (e.g. Lovell 1994). The latter project would focus on how race relates to being male or female in the sexual sense. As we have seen, however, it is difficult to give a watertight definition of what the 'sexual sense' is, and we are not helped here by scholars, who often use the terms sexual and sexuality without defining them.[8] As with the concept of race, sexuality is historically variable and therefore inherently impossible to define completely, yet it is assumed that related sets of phenomena are being dealt with and this is demonstrated precisely by the way scholars can use the term without defining it: 'we'/they already 'know' what they are talking about. Implicitly, then, sexuality is grounded on a common-sense activity called 'having sex' and the myriad related activities, feelings and ideas surrounding it.[9] This is the way I shall use the concept, even if it admittedly still begs the question of exactly what constitutes 'having sex' (a question which is more consequential than the easily solved puzzle of whether Bill Clinton's relations with Monica Lewinsky fell into that category). The point is that, as Moore (1994: 27) suggests, we are better off 'working backwards towards sex, gender, sexual difference and the body, rather than taking them as a set of starting points': what 'having sex' means has to be discovered for particular contexts, rather than assumed in the first place.

Sexuality is thus gendered, in the sense that it is imbued with ideas about maleness and femaleness (even if does not take place between men and women) and gender includes sexuality, in the sense that ideas about men and women (and transgendered people) usually involve ideas about sexuality; but sexuality and gender are not identical and their relationships are one focus of analysis. In a reading of *Gone With the Wind*, Eve Sedgwick argues that sexuality, gender and power domination all 'line up in a perfect chain of echoic meaning' for white women, who are, or are taken as, 'ladies' (1985: 8–9). The 'black mammy' figure,

however, while a woman and subject to power domination, has, in effect, no sexuality. The relationship between sexuality and gender is different for each woman, and generally 'the shapes of sexuality, and what *counts* as sexuality, both depend on and affect historical power relationships' (1985: 2). Interestingly, this example shows how racial hierarchy shapes sexuality. In this book, then, my principal focus will be on sex/sexuality and I shall use the terms interchangeably, as Foucault does, but this will clearly entail a gendered perspective as well.

Conclusion

The problem which drives this book is, in simple terms, why 'the question race always provoked the answer sex', to use Bastide's phrase, or more generally, why race and sex/gender seem to have what I have termed an 'elective affinity' for each other in systems of domination and hierarchy. In the chapters that follow, I attempt to answer that question, in both theoretical and empirical terms.

In Chapter 2, I examine a number of theoretical perspectives that address that problem. My aim is to bring together three elements: an attention to racist and sexist oppression; an awareness of the productive nature of power, which builds a moral order in the process of dominating certain categories of people; and sensitivity to the formation of a desiring self in an ambivalent relation of love/hate with the other.

Chapter 3 looks at historical aspects of race and sex (including homosexuality) in the colonial period. A central theme is sex as an instrument of racialised conquest, building on Europeans' sexualised images of the African and native American other. I then look at the building of a moral order in the colonies, looking first at the work of the Inquisition on sexual and religious transgression, which targeted black and indigenous subjects. I then analyse how patriarchal and racial domination relate to each other, especially through the interweaving of ideas of purity of blood with ideas about the sexual purity and honour of (white) women and the sexual impurity and dishonour of (non-white) women. This introduces the important role of *mestizaje* as a colonial practice which produced racially intermediate *mestizos* through sexual interactions. Finally, the powerful ambivalence that existed around black and indigenous sexual and magical powers is explored.

Chapter 4 examines the period from independence and into the early twentieth century, when science and nation were key transnational frameworks of ideas and practice. The theme of *mestizaje* continues in this chapter, but now as both a social practice and an ideology of nationhood. Honour continued to work as a key mechanism of racial and sexual domination, but within the project of constructing a nation as a moral and social order: eugenics, social hygiene, masculinity and homosexuality are important here. In this context, I examine in detail how race and sex articulate with each other. Finally, I look at the sexualised primitivism of the early twentieth century, which emerges very clearly in the nationalisation of 'black' music, in which the ambivalence of racialised desire and fear can be seen.

Chapter 5 takes the political economy of sex/race as its theme and addresses the relationship between race, money and sex (e.g. using wealth and status to 'buy' racially hypergamous unions, or using 'blackness' to 'seduce' wealthy partners, in what is often seen as a marketplace of racial, class and gender values). I examine the commodification of racialised sexuality, focusing on three areas: interracial sex and *mestizaje*, beauty and eroticism, and sex tourism and sex worker migration. I argue that race relations in Latin America depend on a balance of racism and racial democracy and that this balance depends to a great extent on the way race and sex articulate to create a mixed society in which both oppression and racial ambiguity and tolerance coexist.

Chapter 6 explores the management of sexuality by the state and NGOs, looking at how medical and welfare interventions and policies are connected to the regulation of sexuality, fertility, disease and family life, among other things. I examine how issues of sexuality (and related issues of gender) articulate with racialised processes of political-cultural activism and multicultural governance, both centred on questions of citizenship. I start by looking at the regulation of reproductive and sexual health,

tracing how a multiculturalist recognition of difference, alongside a denial of hierarchy, is underlain by tacit reaffirmations of racial hierarchy, as in *mestizaje*. I then examine sexuality in ethnic-racial social movements, exploring the apparently persistent connection of masculinism and power, which implicitly reinforces some of the basic tenets of male dominance in ideologies of *mestizaje*. In the last sections, I examine sex and race among Latinos in the US, looking first at sexualised images of Latinos and how these are deployed in the construction of the racialised 'Latino' category; and then at how *mestizaje* – the process of interracial sex – is both challenged by and challenges the US racial landscape.

2

EXPLAINING THE ARTICULATION OF RACE AND SEX

My objective in this chapter is to look at ideas about why and how race and sex relate to each other and why they seem to have what Max Weber might have described as an 'elective affinity' for each other, that is, why race so often seems to connote sex, and vice versa. In the first main section, I look at a number of approaches that focus on power and domination as the key to this affinity. I start with a perspective that takes racial domination itself as its main concern, moving to frameworks that combine racism and sexism as they articulate and intersect with each other. These frameworks overlap with Foucauldian theories that start with the productive nature of power and the regulation of sex as a way to exert power but also build a moral order.

In the second main section, I argue that, while power and domination are clearly central and any approach must include them, in order to encompass the very obvious ambivalence that is at the heart of the race/sex conjunction – the coexistence of love and loathing, fear and fascination – we need to address the internal processes in which concepts of self and other are formed and in which desire and fear themselves take shape. I look at perspectives, often of a more psychoanalytic bent, which explore these processes in depth. I then note the critiques that psychoanalytic perspectives have been subject to (especially from the social sciences, but also from philosophy) and look at some examples that suggest a workable balance of social and psychic processes.

Explaining Race and Sex 1: Power, Domination and Governance

A very common approach in tackling the relationship between race and sex is to view them both through the lens of power, domination and inequality. Indeed, it is fair to say that any and all approaches must look through this lens: to understand race and sex, we must understand racism and sexism as systems of oppression. But there is also the vital question of exactly how we understand the operation of power and oppression and what analytical role we assign to different aspects of these multiple processes. Some analysts focus very centrally on what one might call the sociology or political economy of oppression, on domination as the direct exercise of power on subordinate people.

Race, Sex and Oppression

An early example of this approach is Roger Bastide's essay on 'Dusky Venus' and 'Black Apollo' (1961), which set out to explain why in Brazil there existed (and still exists) a cult of eroticism around the figure of the *mulata*, the dusky Venus, the mixed-race, brown-skinned, but not very black, woman. In contrast, in France, there was a glorification, in some circles at least, of the image of the beautiful and hypersexual black man, the black Apollo. For Bastide, the cult of the *mulata* stems from the relations of dominance between whites and non-whites that existed under slavery (abolished in Brazil in 1888) and continued in post-abolition society. Upper-class white men felt themselves to be in a position where they could (ab)use slave women in particular and lower-class women in general (who were often dark-skinned) without suffering any consequences. The children they fathered did not have to be socially recognised as filial kin (although, in practice, they might be) and the men's extramarital relations were ignored, or seen as normal, in a society in which men were dominant figures. This accessibility of non-white women to white men was enough, in Bastide's view, to convert them into highly sexualised objects of erotic desire. Bastide explains that the fact that it was the *mulata* and not the black woman who became the object of a cult is in terms of the former's greater proximity to a European aesthetic norm of physical beauty. In France, black immigrant men from Africa had become fetishised into sex objects because, Bastide argues, they felt a need to avenge themselves on white Europeans for the humiliations they had suffered at their hands during colonialism – which included the sexual (ab)use of black women by white men – and continued to suffer through racism. One way to exact this vengeance was to conquer as many white women as possible: hence the image of the hypersexual black male.

It is not hard to see weaknesses and omissions in Bastide's argument. He does not address the sexualisation of black men in Brazil and of black (and brown) women in Europe, while, for France, he ignores the longer history of the sexualisation of black men, stretching back to the early encounters of Europeans with Africans – a history which might, in fact, support his argument (Jordan 1977; Nagel 2003: 91–7). More importantly, there are easy assumptions made about how the presumed accessibility of black women in slavery (which would anyway only have been true for a minority of white men) translated into the same accessibility of black and brown women outside slavery and also about the way this historical accessibility might explain the cult of the *mulata* in 1950s Brazil. Women's desires are left out of the picture entirely – why would black men's need for revenge through sexual conquest translate into desire for them by some white women – not to mention some white men, a matter that Bastide does not broach at all)? And (white) men's desires are seen as automatic: if a woman is accessible for sex, a man will want sex with her and sexualise her as a result. But this raises the question of why some dominated women (and men) are more sexualised than others. Jordan argues that for North America 'the entire interracial sexual complex did not pertain to the Indian' (1977: 163). Although there is evidence that native American women – and to a lesser extent men – were sexualised in varying ways in the north and south of the continent, I think it is right

to suggest that this was less intense and pervasive than for black men and women.[1]

Yet some of the basics of Bastide's argument have proved enduring: the idea that the power to get sexual access and dominate sexually creates sexual desire for, and thus sexualises, the target of that domination is a common one. The idea that black, or colonised, men feel humiliated and then either want revenge or are fearfully assumed to want revenge, which they will exact through sexual conquest, is also quite common. In the US case, it is often argued that the 'myth of the black rapist', which emerged with force in the late nineteenth-century Southern states, was a tool of political control which relied on the image of a sexually predatory black male seeking revenge (Di Leonardo 1997; Hall 1984; Hernton 1970; Hodes 1993, 1997). The 'myth' argument avoids the imputation that black men will automatically want sexual revenge, but black men's actual desires are left obscure, as in Bastide's argument.

In her pioneering overview of the intersections of race, ethnicity and sexuality, Nagel explores sex and race mainly through the history of the US and follows a similar line to Bastide's. She explains the sexualisation of black women and men in the US in terms of processes of domination (Nagel 2003: ch. 4). This is more than just a question of easy access to dominated women, but the basic approach is similar to Bastide's. Whites made Africans and blacks into sexual Others – seen as radically different, apart from whites, inferior and morally reprehensible in their sexual excesses and lack of control – for three reasons: to justify brutal treatment and especially sexual violation itself; to make black female slaves more saleable (as potential sexual objects); and to justify slave breeding programmes. For black men, the image of the dangerous, hypersexualised predator is linked by Nagel to white fears of vengeance and strategies of political control of slaves and, especially, post-abolition free blacks. (The sexualisation of native Americans is explained in similar terms [2003: 97].) Other aspects of the relationship between race and sex in the US follow from this: the reassertion of an autonomous and powerful black male sexuality in the black civil rights and black power movement is linked to the denial of black male sexual autonomy and freedom under slavery and post-abolition segregation (and seen as a reworking for different political purposes of the image of the sexually potent black man); this black masculinity, along with images of black female sexuality, then caused problems for black women in the civil rights and black identity movements and especially black feminists; the difficult place of homosexuality – sometimes expressed in strong homophobia – among many African Americans, particularly among activists, is also linked to these sexual politics.

Race, Sex and Gender: Intersections and Articulations

Nagel's approach is certainly valid and resonates with that of others, who also emphasise the role of domination and power. Yet Nagel pays surprisingly little direct attention to patriarchy and sexism – in short, to gender relations. In contrast, many authors highlight the fact that power and domination in a racialised system are always gendered: it is usually white men – and heterosexual men at that – who are the most powerful category of people, while the experience and mechanisms of being dominated are different for men and women in important respects, even if they are similar in others.

A pioneering example of this attention to gender is Verena Stolcke's work on nineteenth-century Cuba (Martinez-Alier [Stolcke] 1989 [1974]). She shows how white men secured their dominant position partly by controlling the sexuality of white women, so that family property and inheritance could be controlled and their reputation upheld. 'Honour' was a fundamental concern, and white men took it upon themselves to protect white women's honour and moral reputation by controlling their sexuality and sexual reputation. Only children born within the properly and honourably constituted family were granted full social recognition as offspring. A woman's honour could be endangered by acts of, or rumours about, 'improper' conduct, such as liaisons with inappropriate men, which would almost by definition include men of a lower social status (and thus darker skin) than themselves.

White men, however, could have informal (often extramarital) sexual relations with darker-skinned women of the lower classes without this tarnishing their honour. Children conceived in such relationships were illegitimate and did not receive full social recognition. For black and brown women, however, bearing such a child opened a possible avenue for social mobility, as they might expect to receive some material benefits for themselves and/or their children (even though they were illegitimate) as a result of their relationships with wealthier men. Young white women could also evade control eloping with a man considered inappropriate, thus forcing their parents' hand.

bell hooks follows this lead, arguing that 'racism and sexism are interlocking systems of domination which uphold and sustain one another' and, further, that 'sexuality has always provided gendered metaphors for colonisation' (hooks 1991: 59, 57). hooks, for example, looks at how US black politics was in large part about black men asserting their masculinity and asserts that 'sexism has always been a political stance mediating racial domination, enabling white men and black men to share a common sensibility about sex roles and the importance of male domination' (1991: 59).[2] hooks's work is part of a reaction by feminists of colour, from the 1980s, to the perceived tendency of feminism as formulated by white, Euro-American women to ignore questions of race and racism in their work (Amos and Parmar 1984; Davis 1981). It is these non-white feminists who pioneered the attempt to see race and gender (and sex) in a single analytic frame, a perspective that rapidly took hold (see Zinn and Dill 2005). Moore, for example, recognised the importance of the 'mutual imbrication of race and gender' such that 'one form of difference can be made to stand for another and/or that differences invoked in one context can be used to reformulate differences relevant to another': thus 'men in many oppressed populations are portrayed as both hypermasculine and feminised' (1994: 61) – a paradox which, however, she does not explain.

Anne McClintock also combines race and gender in an integral fashion. She looks at Western imperialism and the associated 'transmission of white, male power through control of colonised

women' which is part of 'a hidden order underlying industrial modernity: the conquest of the sexual and labour power of colonised women' (McClintock 1995: 2–3). Her theoretical approach relies on the idea that 'race, class and gender are not distinct realms of experience, existing in splendid isolation from each other; nor can they simply be yoked together retrospectively like armatures of Lego. Rather they come into existence *in and through* relation to each other – if in contradictory and conflictual ways. In this sense, gender, race and class can be called articulated categories' (1995: 5, emphasis in original). Thus, 'gender dynamics were from the outset, fundamental to the securing and maintenance of the imperial enterprise' (ibid.: 7): in the creation of an 'elaborate analogy between race and gender' (ibid.), for example, colonised lands were feminised in a way that legitimated their conquest by men. Or, in a more complex analysis, McClintock argues that the imperial order in the metropolis depended in part on a patriarchal gender system in which there was a 'cult of domesticity' which confined women to the domestic sphere. However, society also depended on the labour of working-class women, especially as servants. One way of handling – without ever resolving – the contradiction between the norm of women as domestic beings and the reality of their paid labour outside their homes was to racialise working women and project onto them images of 'primitives' that derived from the colonies and were applied not only to women but to the working classes in general (1995: ch. 3). It is notable that a good deal of McClintock's analysis shows how imperial, racial ideas served the interests of metropolitan class and gender hierarchies, rather than showing how gender dynamics operated in the imperial control of racialised others.

Patricia Hill Collins (2000), another key figure in black feminism, takes a similar approach to Nagel's, but like McClintock gives a lot more space to sexism and gender relations. Her basic approach focuses on domination and Othering, mainly in the context of the US. Whites oppress black women through economic exploitation, political marginalisation and ideological manipulation. Black women are placed at the intersection of several overlapping and mutually reinforcing modern Western binaries – between white

and black (with blacks cast as animal and natural against white humanity and civilisation); between men and women (with women cast as natural); and between civilisation and nature (with nature cast as an object open to exploitation by men). A series of images of black women – as mammies, matriarchs, whores – are deployed to facilitate oppression. Collins argues that 'attempts to control black women's sexuality lie at the heart of black women's oppression' (2000: 81) and that the various images all transmit 'distinctive messages about the proper links among female sexuality, desired levels of fertility for working-class and middle-class black women and US black women's placement in social class and citizenship hierarchies'; the images 'represent elite white male interests in defining black women's sexuality and fertility' (ibid.: 84).

Collins explores different theoretical approaches to understanding the relationship between sex and power and how race – specifically black women – fit in to that relationship (ibid.: 128–48). Importantly, she gives much greater prominence than does Nagel (and, even more so, than Bastide) to questions of gender oppression (i.e. sexism and patriarchy) and to questions about the regulation and control of sexualised, reproductive bodies. A first approach starts with heterosexism – the domination of heterosexuality as the norm – as a system of oppression similar to race, class and gender. Although Collins does not mention it, it is clear that this approach has affinities with queer theory, with its emphasis on analysing the construction and effects of dominant heterosexual categories (see e.g. Ferguson 2003). Black sexuality is defined as deviant because it is seen as hypersexual and pathological, just as homosexuality is defined as deviant because it is non-heterosexual. This gives a key to why and how black men and women are oppressed: their sexualities are the target of discrimination, punishment, control and regulation. According to Collins, this approach allows us to see how black male and female sexualities are similar, but also different, how different categories of black women (e.g. young and old, lesbian and straight) vary in their placement in the heterosexist system and also how white and black sexualities are defined in relation to each other (as normal and abnormal). The problem with the approach, in my view, is that it does not manage to specify how heterosexism links up with other systems of oppression: race, class, gender. Collins (2000: 129) states that such a link is necessary, but does not say how it works. We are left wondering what explains the 'elective affinity' of race and sex.

The second approach she outlines attempts to address this issue and looks at how sexuality figures within separate systems of class, race, nation and gender (i.e. rather than taking heterosexism as a system of oppression in its own right, parallel to these others). Collins illustrates this by showing how the image of the black Jezebel operates in oppressions of race (as a factor in maintaining racial segregation and inequality), of class (as a factor in facilitating the commodification of black female sexuality) and of gender (as a factor in defining white womanhood as pure and normal and underwriting patriarchal notions of gender relations). Collins does not criticise this approach in relation to others, but the evident problem is that the various systems of oppression are separated out: similar images of sexuality may occur in each, but we do not get a coherent account of how they fit together.

This relates to a problem that Collins (2000: 18) mentions elsewhere but does not raise in this context, which is that this approach – like the first approach – ends up with an 'additive' model of oppression: working-class black women suffer specifically because they have racial, gender and class oppression all added on top of one another – a triple burden (see e.g. Cock 1980). Working-class black homosexual women (and men) also suffer multiple burdens: of race and class, plus the various heterosexist discriminations that are entailed in sexist gender relations. This captures a real aspect of what is going on and what is experienced by people who are doubly or triply stigmatised, but what such an additive approach fails to capture is how each system relies on the other, for example, how class oppression works through racial oppression and vice versa, so that class oppression combined with racial oppression is different from class oppression without it. In the end, then, this approach does not explain very well why race and sex seem to 'go together' so frequently and easily.

The third approach described by Collins is the one she evidently favours; it is closest to McClintock's perspective too and relies in part on the concept of 'intersection'. Intersectionality is a term used by Kimberlé Crenshaw to capture the fact that 'the intersection of racism and sexism factors into Black women's lives in ways that cannot be captured wholly by looking at the race or gender dimensions of those experiences separately' (1991: 1244): specifically she argues that experiences of violence – rape, domestic abuse – were qualitatively different for black and white women, because, for example, black women had multiple burdens that prevented them seeking support. Meanwhile both feminism and anti-racism marginalised violence against black women. Nash cautions that 'intersectional projects often replicate precisely the [additive] approaches that they critique' (2008: 6): it is important, then, to show how race and gender mutually shape each other.

This is something that Collins manages, at least in part, in her use of the approach. She looks at how different systems of oppression 'intersect' in varying ways to form a 'matrix of domination' which is historically specific. She states: 'This conceptualisation views sexuality as conceptual glue that binds intersecting oppressions together. Stated differently, intersecting oppressions share certain core features. Manipulating and regulating the sexualities of diverse groups constitutes one such shared feature or site of intersectionality'; and 'intersecting oppressions rely on sexuality to mutually construct one another' (2000: 135). This is an original approach insofar as sexuality is not seen as one more vector that intersects with others, but rather as a means through which or a site at which other vectors can intersect. But Collins does not elaborate much on this and instead proceeds to give a series of examples of 'sites of intersection', such as pornography, prostitution and rape, where one can analyse how sexuality acts as the 'glue' by means of which race, class and gender operate and constitute each other. Her analysis of prostitution, however, reads as very similar to the analysis of the image of the black Jezebel in the second approach, above: Collins shows how the images and practices around (black) prostitution serve the varied interests of class exploitation, racial oppression and sexist gender divisions.

Nevertheless, the theoretical point is that race, class and gender are able to work together and shape each other *because* they can all operate through images and practices around sexuality. And one can see how, as in Stolcke's work on Cuba, Collins is indicating how a sex/gender hierarchy is maintained through racial hierarchy, and vice versa. Images of sexual propriety and immorality constitute whiteness and blackness and provide a mechanism whereby both racial hierarchy (white over black) and sex/gender hierarchy (men over women, hetero over homo) are enacted. The emphasis on the regulation of sexuality also gives a good basis on which to encompass non-hetero sexualities. Rather than non-hetero sexualities being seen as just another form of oppression (in Collins' first approach), or an additional element in a sexist gender system (in her second), they can be analysed in terms of their 'deviance', with this now defined in terms of their perceived outcomes for the moral and biological reproduction of society at large.

This conceptual position is allied to that adopted by Judith Butler who – along with others who have grappled with queer theory (e.g. Hammonds 1994) – has argued that analysis must avoid setting up 'racism and homophobia and misogyny as parallel or analogical relations' (i.e. the additive model). Instead, 'what has to be thought through, is the ways in which these vectors of power require and deploy each other for the purpose of their own articulation' (Butler 1993: 18). Rejecting both an approach that privileges sex/gender difference as more fundamental than other differences and one that juxtaposes distinct spheres of power or adduces a 'list of attributes separated by those proverbial commas (gender, sexuality, race, class)', Butler tries to see how, for race and sexuality, 'one cannot be constituted save through the other'. She suggests, for example, that the hierarchical ordering of humans into 'male' and 'female' does not only take place in relation to a taboo on homosexuality, but also 'through a complex set of racial injunctions which operate in part through the taboo on miscegenation' (1993: 167–8). Racial and gender norms are 'articulated through one another' (ibid.: 182).

What Butler means by articulation is not made very explicit, but a good way of explaining it is to say that, in a simple analogy, one bone (or 'vector') added to another bone gives twice as much bone, but doesn't make a limb; but articulate the bones together and you get a new functional entity, with different effects and powers: the whole is more than the sum of its parts. That 'articulation' also means expression captures the idea that the functional entity in question is also a discursive one, and this usefully unsettles the overly mechanical nature of the bone image: articulated elements do not have an inherent connection but can – through ideological and material labour – be rearticulated into other formations.[3] As Clifford (2001: 478) says, 'When you understand a social or cultural formation as an articulated ensemble it does not allow you to prefigure it on an organic model, as a living, persistent, "growing" body, continuous and developing through time. An articulated ensemble is more like a political coalition or, in its ability to conjoin disparate elements, a cyborg.' Yet the mechanical image of the anatomical joint can capture the emergent potential generated by articulation, as well as the possibility that particular elements – such as race and sex – may articulate together in related, if changing, ways over time.

The concepts of intersection and articulation are not necessarily identical: the image of intersection seems to imply a static point or space delineated by intersecting vectors; the image of (re-)articulation is more dynamic and flexible – and to my mind preferable – yet both capture the fact that the way race and sex (and other vectors) work together is more than just additive. If we think of the ideological–material complex of 'black male sexuality' – for argument's sake, in the US – this is more than just racial oppression (white over black) plus elements of gender/sexuality (men over women): it is a whole distinct 'space' or functional articulation which operates in myriad ways in the context of racial domination (e.g. lynching), gender oppression (the protection of white womanhood), heterosexism (the difficulties of being black and gay), and so on. Like a traffic intersection, it is a crossroads around which grows up a distinctive set of features that would not emerge around each single road alone; like an articulated limb, it brings new potentialities to the individual vectors that make it up.

Collins, however, adds to this picture by specifying sexuality as a common terrain for intersecting vectors of oppression: each vector already implies a concern with sexuality and this allows them to work together. Collins refers very little to Foucault in her book, but his view of sexuality as a key domain for the operation of different forms of power in Western society since the late eighteenth century is clearly relevant here. This implies that the role of sexuality as what Collins calls a 'glue' is not coincidental (as it is in the second approach Collins outlines, where sexuality just happens to appear in each system of oppression), but derives from the central place sexuality has in modern Western society. A further implication is that sexuality's role may be historically specific: sexuality might not have played exactly this role in, say, early colonial Latin America (although, as we shall see, sexuality *was* a key part of racial domination in that context and this indicates that one might want to retain a central role for sexuality in *any* hierarchical system, linked to the role sexual reproduction plays in the maintenance of social inequality). These two implications constitute an important reminder: without them, Collins runs the risk of seeing sexuality as self-evidently implied, always and everywhere, in race, class and gender – which begs the main question of why these vectors get entangled with sexuality at all.

Race, Sex and Regulation

Collins' attention to the regulation of sexuality brings us to a slightly different theoretical vantage point from the one I started with, which emphasises domination and the way this allows white men privileged access to subordinate, racialised women. I might say that while the domination-oriented vantage point attends to the *sexualisation of race*, the sexual regulation vantage point begins with the *racialisation of sex*. Obviously, these are two sides of the same coin, not opposed viewpoints – they both depend on an analysis of power and domination. But the first starts with the fact of racial hierarchy and tries to explain its sexualisation

in terms of what that hierarchy allowed racially dominant men to do; while the second starts with the fact of sexuality and its entanglement in systems of power and inequality, and then arrives at the way race gets involved.

Many of the approaches already discussed would be unhappy with this division: McClintock, Moore, Collins, Butler and others want to address the 'mutual constitution' of race and sex/gender (and class) – I believe rightly – and this means not 'starting' analytically with either race or sex/gender, but instead grasping how they 'come into existence *in and through* relation to each other', to use McClintock's phrase. But the distinction serves as a useful device for the current purposes of exposition, because it focuses on the process of sexual reproduction in any social system and especially ones based on hierarchy. If privilege and resources are to be limited to certain classes or categories, then the issue of how property and status are transmitted across generations is vital, entailing questions about who has children with whom and with what consequences – in short, questions about systems of kinship, family, filiation and gendered sexual reproduction. The distinction is also temporarily useful because it brings into sharper focus a Foucauldian perspective (already apparent in the work of such as Moore and Butler), which emphasises that power is *productive* as well as oppressive: these systems of racism and sexism act to oppress certain categories of people, but they also seek to build a certain moral order and shape subjects within that order. A principal means of doing this is through the regulation of sexuality. As we shall see, however, using sex/gender as a starting point, in Foucauldian style, can lead to a neglect of race. Including race as a key analytic concern in effect brings us back to intersections and articulations of race and sex/gender, but now with a greater appreciation of the productive side of power.

The importance of the regulation of sexuality is evident in work on the relationship between nationalism, gender and sexuality, much of which stresses how women – and, more generally, 'proper' heterosexuality – are placed as key objects in the building, reproduction and bounding of the nation (Gopinath 2003; McClintock 1993; Mosse 1985; Nagel 2003: ch. 5; Parker et al. 1992b; Radcliffe 1999; Radcliffe and Westwood 1996; Weinbaum 2004; Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989; Yuval-Davis and Werbner 1999). Yuval-Davis and Anthias (1989: 7) list the various ways in which women figure in nationalist discourse, including as biological reproducers of national bodies, as cultural nurturers of national citizens, as symbols of nationhood and as participants in national struggles. Women are often seen as guardians and civilisers, although they may also be seen as a threat, especially through their sexuality, if it is channelled into 'improper' directions, such as prostitution (Guy 1991). Likewise, although nationalism vaunts a homosocial brotherhood of men, it avoids the implication of a 'deviant' homosexuality (Gill 1997; Mosse 1985; see also Sedgwick 1985): sexuality must be of the 'proper' kind, conducive to the good of the nation.

The regulation of sexuality also brings us, as I have mentioned, to Foucault and his contention that the history of Western society shows a shift from a 'symbolics of blood' to an 'analytics of sexuality' (Foucault 1998 [1979]). In the former system, there was an emphasis on juridical power held by a sovereign monarch, who exercised direct control over society and people's bodies; issues of kinship, sex and genealogy were important, but depended on what Foucault called the deployment of alliance, in which matrimony and sex were controlled by legal and religious codes in the service of maintaining society and its moral order in a state of homeostasis. In the analytics of sexuality, power becomes 'bio-power' in which the life-force of society, embodied in the sexuality of its citizens, becomes the focus for a whole system of management and administration aimed at increasing and optimising that force in the productive project of building and shaping individual subjects, the national population and ultimately the species. Rather than homeostasis, the aim is now expansion and the ever-increasing regulation of individual bodies. 'Sex is the means of access both to the life of the body and the life of the species' (Foucault 1998 [1979]: 146). This is what gives it such a central position, making it the subject of discursive elaborations about the secrets of life and society, to be controlled by sets of rules about 'normal' and 'deviant' sexualities that apply to whole populations or categories

of populations (women, children), rather than just the conjugal couple. Ann Stoler notes that to speak of a straight shift from one system to the other in Foucault's work is too simple:

> The deployment of sexuality is 'superimposed', it does not 'supplant' the deployment of alliance, but is constructed out of the latter, imbuing it with a new tactic of power. The family is the site of this convergence, not a structure of alliance that constrains sexuality, as the conventional account would have it, but that which provides its most crucial support. (Stoler 1995: 38)

As Foucault himself puts it, 'the preoccupation with blood and the law has for nearly two centuries haunted the administration of sexuality' (1998 [1979]: 149).

Stoler (1995: 19–94) explains how race figures in Foucault's account. He identified racism as an ideology that emerged in seventeenth-century Europe, linked to ideas about internal enemies threatening society and the aristocracy defending itself against an emergent bourgeoisie: notions of purity of blood operated in family and noble genealogies. In the nineteenth century, this developed – through a process of the continuous re-inscriptions of meanings that makes it hard to say when race as an ideology really 'began' – into a statist biological racism that worked to define which categories of people and bodies were to be regulated in which ways and worked as much in terms of class divisions as it did in terms of 'internal enemies' (the Jews, the Irish) and external colonial populations (although Foucault only mentions the latter for the late nineteenth century). Some categories of people, including the working classes (and, as McClintock argues, women), were in danger of racial degeneration and threatened society and it moral order with racial contamination. In the defence and productive construction of society, seventeenth-century notions of purity of blood were collectivised and moved from the family to the population and category levels, becoming part of the discourse on sexuality seen in terms of bodily purity, hygiene and vigour.

Stoler contends that Foucault neglects to take account of the role of colonialism (and, indeed, gender) in the way race and sexuality

worked together: his approach is altogether too Eurocentric (1995: 91–3). Using her research on Dutch and French colonies in south-east Asia, she argues that a concern with regulating the sexuality of racialised categories of people prefigured the concern with sexuality in Europe itself and that what was happening in the colonies was intimately linked to what was happening in Europe. She also emphasises the coexistence of the symbolics of blood with the analytics of sexuality in the colonial context, arguing that they were entwined from an early date (from the sixteenth century in the Spanish and Portuguese colonies), despite an overall shift towards the regulation of sexuality through science and medicine in the nineteenth century. It is worth noting that JanMohamed also argues that, in the US southern states under slavery and Jim Crow segregation, racialised sexuality had more in common with Foucault's regime of alliance and juridical power than with an analytics of sexuality; for example, in the deployment of ideologies about kinship and the impossibility of a kinship link between whites and blacks (JanMohamed 1990).

Stoler argues that 'discourses of sexuality, racial thinking and rhetorics of nationalism have several things in common' (1995: 133): they all seek to link internal moral essences to external visible markers in strategies of inclusion and exclusion, which are linked to the defence of the social body against degeneration and abnormality. In the Dutch and French colonies of south-east Asia, there was intense administrative concern with the conduct, upbringing and morality, including sexual morality, of colonial populations – not only, indeed not even principally, the native peoples, but rather the white working-class colonials, the local-born white colonials and the mixed-race offspring of Europeans and native people. As Young (1995) has argued, racial thinking often concentrates on the question of mixture and hybridity. Colonial authorities feared that white people in the colonies could easily be contaminated by the climate and by the natives themselves; the proper, controlled sexuality and morality that was thought appropriate to Europeans, whether in Europe or in the colonies, was in danger in the tropics. People's very nature could become degenerate in this environment where Asian natives

were seen as sexually uncontrolled and promiscuous. Particularly vulnerable were women, whose honour was to be protected, and children, especially because the latter were often being brought up – even breastfed – by native servants who, it was feared, exercised a corrupting influence.

From a Foucauldian perspective, then, if the question of race provokes the answer sex, it is because sexuality is a privileged site for thinking about moral value and exclusion/inclusion in the context of producing and regulating society, nation and persons. Racial thinking gets drawn into this matrix because it too deals with these issues. The logic of the relationship between race and sexuality in a Foucauldian argument is basically that sexuality is central because it is about the reproduction of society, especially in contexts of hierarchy (and this would be the case, albeit in different ways, under a regime governed by the symbolics of blood or an analytics of sexuality). If society is hierarchical in racialised ways, then sexuality inevitably intertwines with racial thinking – and all the more so in a regime in which sexuality becomes an absolutely central focus of power. The difference between Foucault and Stoler is that the latter shows that 'the cultivations of bourgeois sensibilities [about morality and sexuality] were inextricable from the nationalist and racial underpinnings of them' (1995: 135). Foucault underestimates these links and thus underestimates the constitutive role of race and empire in the construction of notions of sexuality.

The approach which focuses on the regulation of sexuality is an immensely powerful way of understanding how race and sex relate to each other, but there are some potential pitfalls with a Foucauldian approach that need attention. First, Stoler's work shows us that we need to be open-minded about what constitutes 'sexual reproduction'. Her late nineteenth-century subjects believed that white people in the tropics could be shaped or 'contaminated' by the environment and the native people and that this could change their very natures in ways that might be reflected in their offspring. This derived from the widespread Lamarckian belief in the possibility that characteristics acquired in one's lifetime could be passed, through sexual reproduction, to one's children (Wade 2002: 23, 63–5). This alerts us to the need to guard against the assumption that we automatically know what is involved in 'sexual reproduction' in any given context (cf. Weinbaum 2004: 2). An articulation between race and sex in this context would include contamination of white people by the native milieu, which appears to a modern Western observer to be non-sexual.

Second, some care needs to be taken with the notion of sexual and social reproduction. If people in stratified societies are concerned with social reproduction and therefore with sexuality, then it is also the case that social reproduction is not confined to sexual reproduction, but occurs through the many mechanisms which ensure continuity to social orders and institutions, even if sexual reproduction is an underlying necessity for this continuity. Of course, a concern with sexual reproduction can extend well beyond actual reproductive sexual relations between men and women (as Foucault himself shows in detail), such that homosexuality, masturbation and women's sexuality as a female pathology all became key issues in nineteenth-century European ideas about sexuality. But there is also a sense in which an overriding concern with sexuality – seeing it as the vital key to understanding modern Western society – may run the risk of reducing other factors, such as race, to a secondary, derivative status. Thus McClintock argues that 'By privileging sexuality ... as the invented principle of social unity, Foucault forgets how an elaborate analogy *between* race and gender became ... an organising trope for other social forms' (1995: 7; emphasis in original). And McClintock contends that colonised peoples and lands were feminised, just as women were primitivised. This not only draws our attention to gender – 'feminists have long questioned how Foucault could write a history of sexuality without gender or for that matter without women' (Stoler 1995: 93) – but also to race as a project that, especially in colonialism, had its own dynamic of control and regulation. As we have seen, Stoler's project is to reinstate the context of colonialism and racial hierarchy into Foucault's history of sexuality, so we can see how colonial concerns with the governance of colonised

peoples and lands, and the deployment of ideas about race in that context, worked on and through ideas about sexuality.

A slightly different but useful example of an approach that owes much to Foucault in its focus on the regulation of sexuality, but that also enquires into how this relates to race, is the work of Elizabeth Povinelli. Like Collins, she outlines existing approaches that 'add' gender and sexuality to other phenomena such as race or indigeneity (to give race *and* sexuality), or that see race as 'transformed' by sex/gender (to give gendered racial subjects) and she sees these as useful but insufficient (Povinelli 2006: 11–13). Povinelli's own approach and its difference from the existing ones are not stated with such clarity, but she sees it as 'not so different from the biopolitical project that Michel Foucault outlined' in her concern with how 'love, intimacy and sexuality are not about desire, pleasure or sex per se, but about things like geography, history, culpability and obligation; the extraction of wealth and the distribution of life and death; and the seemingly self-evident fact and value of freedom' (ibid.: 9–10). Povinelli's project is to uncover the relationships between forms of love and intimacy and forms of liberal governance and, in an echo of Stoler, she argues that 'If you want to locate the hegemonic home of liberal logics and aspirations, look to love in the settler colonies', such as Australia and the US (ibid.: 17). Like Foucault, she in interested in how liberal governance constructs and uses notions of sexuality (and love and intimacy), but like Stoler, Povinelli gives greater emphasis to empire, and thus race, in this process.

A concrete example is her analysis of laws that regulate Australian Aboriginal land claims. These laws use a notion of 'traditional owners' – those who make the claim under law and thereafter own the land collectively – defined according to Western heterosexist genealogical norms, which assume that legitimate and authentic kinship links are established by heterosexual reproduction. These links serve to delimit a set of kin who are the 'owners' for legal purposes, but the norms ignore other types of relationships, such as homosexual ones, or even heterosexual ones, between Aborigines and non-Aborigines, which in Aboriginal eyes also establish legitimate claims to clan land. In effect, a subtle regulation of what counts as legitimate sexuality (racially bounded, heterosexual) is used to police how land claims are made and, moreover, what counts as a 'real' Aborigine – not the offspring of a racially 'mixed' union, but, and more generally, a person saturated by the kind of constraints envisaged in the genealogical imaginary of liberalism, that is the image, in liberal ideology, of society and its people governed and constrained by longstanding links of kinship, nation, race, biology and inheritance (Povinelli 1997, 2002: ch. 5).

* * *

I started this chapter with models of racial domination that permit white men to dominate black women (and men) and thus gain sexual access to them; sex is used as a tool for racial oppression. This is a central and enduring insight, but we need to incorporate gender and patriarchy in a more decisive way and this led us on to models of the intersection and articulation of sex/gender and race, which looked at both sexist and racist modes of oppression together. This in turn led us directly to a Foucauldian approach which starts with the regulation of sex as a productive practice of governance in which moral orders are being built, as well as categories of people oppressed. In the hands of analysts such as Stoler, this approach is recast so as to bring us back, in effect, to questions of intersection and articulation, seeing race and sex as linked through their mutual entanglement, in strongly gendered ways, with modes of governance. Race is about an ideology and practice of hierarchy and inequality, but so too is sex; these domains operate on a common ground that spreads over colonial and postcolonial spaces. The linkage also works because both race and sex (and gender) deploy a language and concepts of body and human nature: a key feature of ideologies of race is that 'racial' traits are passed on through sexual reproduction (although not through that means alone, as Stoler's work shows); hence the abiding concern with 'mixed-race' people which Young (1995).

However, many of the approaches reviewed so far in my view fall short of really delving into the mechanics of erotic desire and

the ambivalent operation of desire and fear. As Moore (2007: 44) says, 'what gets left out is the importance of understanding and analysing fantasy, desire and unconscious motivation'. Systems of oppression may require, or certainly encourage, processes of othering, but why does this focus so strongly on sexuality? And why does the denigration of a specific category of people also seem to produce such ambivalence, manifest in desire for that category? One can argue, along with much of the literature on rape, that sex between dominated and dominant groups is about power, not about sexual desire, but it is unconvincing to say that the sexualisation of black men and women in the Americas and the related sexual imagery around whites (and indigenous people, not to mention Asians and other ethnic-racial categories) does *not* include some aspects of the workings of desire – and of fear and hate.[4] Doris Sommer argues that white men were 'seduced as much by the absolute power of their racial and sexual advantage as by their partner's sexual charms' (1991: 128), but this separates out the elements of 'charm' and 'power' in a way that I find unhelpful. The point is that desire/fear and power are intimately conjoined in their very production, so to say that sex is about one *rather than* or *as much as* the other does not really work.

In order to understand the process of othering and the production of ambivalence – (sexual) desire alongside anxiety and fear – some scholars have turned to the dynamics of self and other formation, using insights from psychoanalytic theories. Such scholars tend to come from literary and film studies, philosophy and queer theory – fields I have already been dipping into and which some social scientists and historians may view with suspicion (Moore 2007: ch. 1) – but I think it is necessary to review these approaches and consider what they have to offer, generally in terms of connecting race and sex, but particularly in terms of explaining ambivalence.

Explaining Race and Sex 2: Self, Other and Ambivalence

Patricia Hill Collins, like many others, depends on a concept of othering in her account of the articulations of race, sexuality,

gender and class. The basic idea is simple – perhaps, too simple. Any dominant group will create a notion of outsider, who is excluded from membership; more than this, outsiders are defined as other, that is, radically and essentially different from self, beyond the pale of inclusion. Once a category of people is defined as other, the way is opened to treat its members in all kinds of discriminatory ways, create negative and indeed fantastical images about them, and use them as a scapegoat for a host of real and imagined ills. Edward Said's classic work on Orientalism (1985) describes at length the way the West constructed an image of the Orient as other, through a range of deployments of academic and popular knowledge, knowledge which often purported to be 'true' and objective, but which actually participated in the discursive construction of 'the Orient'. In this process, the West was consistently cast not just as superior, but as the norm (rational, masculine, morally upright), while the Orient was seen as irrational, feminised, eroticised and morally suspect.

One of the problems with Said is his tendency to over-generalise the othering process: all of the Orient is included, despite huge variations in the history of colonialism in and scholarship about different regions; there is a tendency to conflate not only different types of academic scholarship and very different perspectives within it, but also academic and popular representations of the Orient. In addition, the colonial studies perspective that takes much of its inspiration from Said may focus too strongly on the white man/native female relationship, marginalising other relationships and giving too much power to the white, male, colonial gaze or discourse (Manderson and Jolly 1997a: 7–9).

Yet the basic concept of othering remains a powerful one, as it taps into some key processes of identity formation. One aspect, frequently noted by scholars who trace practices of othering, is that, while the other is defined as different and inferior and thus as actually or potentially dangerous and threatening, the other may also be seen as mysteriously attractive, fascinating and powerful. That power may be perceived as operating in various spheres: the healing of mind and body, the intuitive understanding and manipulation of nature and the supernatural,

the physical embodiment of special skills (e.g. in music, dance, sport) – and, of course, sexuality (sexual prowess, erotic intensity, desirability).[5] This ambivalence has been widely observed, but less often explained robustly. Stoler (1995: 171–6) notes that a common tendency in colonial studies is to deploy Freudian-derived notions of displacement and projection. White men, European colonial powers or the West generally have 'repressed' their (male) sexuality in the process of becoming 'civilised' (which involved the domination and control of 'nature', including, in the Western view, sexuality), but these repressed feelings and desires are 'projected' and 'displaced' onto others, who may include women, the working classes, colonised peoples and regions, and racialised categories. Thus these others become the locus of ideas about natural powers in general, and specifically sexual powers. These ideas of repression raise the spectre of psychoanalytic approaches, but do not really help us to understand them.

Frantz Fanon on Race and Sex

Frantz Fanon has been an important influence on theorists who seek to bring psychoanalytic insights into understanding race and sex. This Martinican psychiatrist who worked for a long time in French Algeria focused on processes of self-formation in colonial contexts and tried to link a psychoanalytic focus on the individual to a social analysis of power and politics. In some ways, his analysis is quite simple: for example, in his account of the relation between black women and white men, he says that black Antillean women are obsessed with finding a white, or light-skinned, man. This racial self-denial is a direct product of racial hierarchy and results in a neurosis of alienation (Fanon 1986 [1952]: ch. 2). The chapter he dedicates to black men and white women is very similar: black men are desperate for white approval (at least in the case Fanon analyses, an Antillean-born man, raised in France) and thus obsessively seek white women with whom they cannot, however, form satisfactory relationships, resulting in a neurosis rooted in the anguish of 'abandonment' (of the black man primarily by white society and white women, but also by his own black society and his black mother) and manifested in a lack of self-esteem and a defensive-aggressive posture (ibid.: 72–8).

While this account may over-generalise about black men and women, it does explain something about ambivalence: racially subordinate men and women desire a relationship with a person who is racially dominant, but are either denied it or must deny themselves having it; hence ambivalent feelings emerge. This is useful partly because it addresses ambivalence among the subordinates: the combination of desire and fear is not only characteristic of dominant people's affective reactions to their others; ambivalence may be linked to hierarchy, but not necessarily to dominance.

But if we want to know more generally why race and sex 'go together' so powerfully, we are left with an analysis that is close to Bastide's, with which we started, except that Fanon is focusing on the desires of black men and women: as social subordinates they want recognition and status and seek to achieve it through sexual relationships. 'I wish to be acknowledged not as *black* but as *white*. ... When my restless hands caress those white breasts, they grasp civilisation and dignity and make them mine' (1986 [1952]: 63). Desire is a direct product of (the lack of) power.

Fanon goes deeper into the reasons for the mutuality of race and sex when he tries to understand 'The Negro and Psychopathology'. The context is again a colonial one in which black people are instilled with a sense of their own inferiority, but here Fanon is specifically interested in white racism and the black person as 'phobogenic' (liable to produce phobias in others). Fanon notes that phobias often hide repressed sexual desires: 'the Negrophobic woman is in fact nothing but a putative partner [i.e. desires sex with black men] – just as the Negrophobic man is a repressed homosexual' (ibid.: 156). He explains this in two main ways.

First, in a long footnote, he states that 'the real Other for the white man is and will continue to be the black man' (ibid.: 161). This Fanon explains, very loosely, in terms of the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan's mirror stage, a period between the age of six and 18 months in which, Lacan said, the child sees itself in the mirror

and (mis)recognises itself as a whole, independent being, while still experiencing its own body as uncoordinated and fragmented (Lacan 2001: 1–7). The child loves the image as an ideal and can identify with it (and thus look back on him- or herself from the position of the mirror-image), but also feels aggression and envy towards it because it highlights the child's own sense of fragmentation. This image is 'other', but is actually a projection of the Ego and expresses a dual relationship, a splitting of the self: the child experiences itself as self by seeing itself as other (and as others would see it). Fanon proposes that the 'appearance of the Negro' causes – for reasons he does not explain – 'the young white at the usual age [to] undergo an imaginary aggression' (1986 [1952]: 161). Somehow, the black person automatically takes on the role of the 'other' – and the other of the self now becomes radically separate. The white man also takes on this role for the black man, but the difference is that for the white man 'the Other is perceived ... absolutely as the not-self ... the unassimilable', whereas for the black man 'historical and economic realities come into the picture' (ibid.: 161–3), that is, colonialism creates a context in which the black man is denied subjectivity and made into an object for the white man, but judges himself in relation to the white and wishes to identify with him (see also Fuss 1994: 21). As such a radical other, the black man (and Fanon is usually talking about men here) serves as an object onto which to project all kinds of feelings and images, including ones about sex and particularly anxiety about sex: 'the Negro, because of his body, impedes the postural schema of the white man' (1986 [1952]: 160) and this is manifested in 'the fear of the sexual potency of the Negro' (ibid.: 164).[6]

Second, Fanon makes the Freudian argument that 'every intellectual gain requires a loss in sexual potency': the 'civilised' white man retains a longing for that lost potency and projects 'his own desires onto the Negro'.[7] But this is partly because, for Fanon, 'the Negro' has already been 'fixated at the genital' – for reasons that he does not explain (ibid.: 165).[8]

Fanon has been criticised for his lack of attention to black women, his homophobia and his tendency to overdraw the

oppositions between black and white, creating a dualism that does not capture the ambivalences of the colonial situation.[9] My concern is that, in the end, he does not give us a very coherent explanation of how race and sex work together at the points of convergence between colonialism and subject formation. He relies on Freudian ideas that 'civilisation' entails the repression of sexuality and on rather ill-defined mechanisms of projection and displacement in which the black man is somehow peculiarly suited to take on the role of other for the white man (and presumably woman too). That this othering takes a specifically sexual form – compared to the othering of the Jew, which Fanon says centres on images of money – is only explained by the fact that 'in relation to the Negro everything takes place on the genital level' (1986 [1952]: 157). This genital fixation itself is never explained, although Fanon does set great store by the black body, its *visibility*, its very blackness. The black man has undergone the 'epidermalisation' (ibid.: 13) of his economic inferiority; the experience of racism for Fanon – 'Look, a Negro!' – meant that 'the corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by a racial epidermal schema' (ibid.: 112). It may be that the importance of the physical body, for Fanon, led to the importance of sexuality in images of black men.

Psychoanalysis, Gender and Ambivalence

To understand better the way race and sex relate in the process of othering and specifically how ambivalence emerges, let us start with the basic process of self-formation. We shall assume for the moment that this takes place (for argument's sake, in a 'Western' context')[10] in a way that, in keeping with some widely shared tenets of psychoanalytic theory, gives rise to tensions and ambivalence. The developing child has to separate itself from the mother (or adult carer), and this is achieved by recognising the mother as a being distinct from oneself, and also by seeing oneself as an independent being. According to Lacan (2001: 1–7), this happens during the mirror phase, in which one perceives one's own individuality – and this is legitimated by a caring adult. In a key sense, one gains a sense of self by seeing from the point

of view of another: I have already alluded to this splitting or doubling of the self, which Homi Bhabha (1986: xiv) calls the Otherness of the Self, and which is not just an infantile phase but a condition of being human. (Lacan himself saw the mirror 'phase' as something that did not just happen at a certain period of infancy, but was a protracted process.) This makes the self an inherently ambivalent construction: the self is an ideal illusion of stability and mastery, dependent on recognition by others (and oneself as other); having an illusive coherence, it is inevitably threatened by fragmentation. A relation of aggressive tension exists between self as embodied being (an experience of potential fragmentation and loss of mastery) and self as Ego or self as other (an image of coherence and control).

The self also emerges from the loss of original unity with the world/mother and is forever marked by that loss, adding to the ambivalence (Tyler 1994). From a Lacanian perspective, desire then is the wish to return to the original unitary wholeness and oneness with the world/mother, banishing the loss or lack caused by the basic rupture which constituted selfhood and, indeed, the emergence into language and culture. Desire is unconscious, but it is not a primal instinct: it is structured by and expressed in the language and symbols that the emergent self acquires. The original unitary wholeness is conceived as 'Other', even though, when the child was in it, no concept of Other existed, because it is only by rupturing with that oneness that its existence can be conceived. The return to oneness is impossible once selfhood has been achieved, but it is also prohibited, as it would imply an incestuous relation with the mother (in Freudian terms) or, understanding this metaphorically (and in more Lacanian terms), a refusal of entry into language and culture, a refusal to obey their laws (which in a patriarchal society are symbolically the Law of the Father). Thus the desire for oneness is repressed and this results in ambivalence: the Other is desired, but that desire is repressed; the Other is forbidden and aggression is directed against it. The Other is at once the original libidinal unity with the world/mother and the repressive Law of the Father, the system of linguistic and cultural rules that make possible the self and

thus also make it possible to conceive the Other in the first place. The Other in this sense is not an actual person, but a concept of Otherness, which is informed by and informs relationships with actual others.[11] In short, desire has ambivalence at its core: it expresses a wish to submerge oneself, but also a fear of doing so, because it will lead to loss of self in the social world.

Jessica Benjamin provides a similar way to understand the roots of ambivalence. In a critical reformulation of Freudian, Lacanian and other currents in psychoanalysis, and drawing especially on what is known as object relations theory, Benjamin outlines a key tension in self formation between 'the need to establish autonomy and the need to be recognised by the other' (1984: 293). The paradoxical link between these two is that in order to feel autonomous, we want to be recognised as such by others, typically the ones on whom we are most dependent. This is a version of the Otherness of the Self: seeing oneself through the eyes of others. Benjamin's formulation differs in some respects from the Lacanian and Oedipal emphasis on desire as linked primarily to regaining a lost primordial unity; desire is instead linked to a struggle for autonomy, which necessarily entails dependence. Total dependence means death of self, which is to be feared; total autonomy, also to be feared, means isolation and lack of the very recognition that makes autonomy meaningful. Successful 'differentiation' (i.e. the process of acquiring a self) means balancing between these two.[12] Ambivalence lies in the fact that the things one wants (autonomy, recognition) are also to be feared.

This is no more than an outline sketch, which glosses over important differences in psychoanalytic approaches, but it can help to understand ambivalence. From a psychoanalytic perspective, the fundamental processes through which the self is formed entail a basic ambivalence of desire and aggression, of identification and denial. Although it is perhaps not self-evident why this should involve *sexual* feelings (desire is not only sexual), it is fundamental to the whole of psychoanalysis that these processes of self-formation are also processes of the formation of sexed, gendered and sexual selves: 'becoming a sexed being is a condition for subjecthood', although this happens in

culturally diverse ways (Moore 1994: 17). Benjamin asserts that 'the common psychological root of ... erotic experiences can be found in the earliest issues of intimacy and separation in infancy' (1984: 292). More specifically, she argues, following Bataille, that eroticism centres on the fundamental tension between autonomy and dependence, because eroticism, and especially erotic dominance, 'breaks the taboo between life [autonomy] and death [total loss of self in the other, total dependence] and breaks through our discontinuity from the other'. She adds: 'Perhaps the most important way in which human beings experiment with loss of differentiation is through sex' (ibid.: 296, 97).

I have been working through these ideas about self formation because I think they can help us to grasp how the formation of self is a fundamentally ambivalent process, which is intimately related to the other and which generates powerful dynamics of both desire and fear, attraction and threat, realisation of mastery and profound dependence, all of which are deeply linked to sex and gender. Thus far, I have discussed these processes in a rather abstract way, divorced from their social context, but of course self formation takes place in a social world, which, in the West and in many other contexts, is divided by hierarchy and infused with power relations. For psychoanalysis, the key hierarchy involved has been gender itself and this has been the subject of extensive debate. To start with, the work of Freud (and, for some, Lacan) is strongly gendered in a patriarchal style and is also heterosexist: it takes a Western sex/gender hierarchy as given. The primary adult from whom the child separates is the mother; a return to original oneness is a return to the mother; the person who forbids the incest of the son with the mother is the father; the emergence of self into language and law is submission to the Law of the Father; a 'healthy' sexual development is seen as heterosexual; homosexuality occurs when 'normal' Oedipal processes go awry.

Feminist and queer theorists have been critical of these patriarchal and heteronormative formulations while also building on and reformulating them in many different directions, which still see sexual difference as key to the formation of self.[13] This

extensive literature is beyond the scope of the present chapter, but the underlying point is to see these processes of self and other formation as structured differently for males and females in Western society, not only because sexual difference itself is posited as foundational in the emergence of self, but also because selves are formed in a society in which marked gender divisions already exist (e.g. women tend to do the childcare) and are strongly hierarchical (e.g. childcare is low-paid and low-status work).

Very briefly, the formation of self for a boy requires a more radical separation from the mother (who is usually the key other in relation to whom the self takes shape) than for a girl who, although she also has to separate from the concept of the mother, does not have to constitute herself as a different, socially defined category of sex/gender in the process. In his effort to construct a solid masculine identity, the boy objectifies the mother and – and this is the key point – given the gender hierarchies that already exist, denigrates her too (or at least consigns her to a subordinate role). Girls tend to identify more with the mother and the feminine gender role. Some formulations of this male/female difference thus see men who have grown up in male-dominated (usually Western) societies as having more insecure sex/gender identities than women, a greater drive towards self-sufficiency, autonomy and control, less predisposition to emotional nurturance and a tendency to objectify women (Chodorow 1978; Giddens 1992: 115–17). In short, when selves are fashioned in the context of gender hierarchy, women can emerge as a category of other (for men), surrounded by ambivalence. Likewise, as gay, lesbian and queer theorists have pointed out, when self formation takes place in a context in which sexuality is subject to powerful hierarchies and norms, homosexuals are labelled as other (Butler 1993; De Lauretis 1994a; Warner 1999; Weed and Schor 1997).

Self, Other and Hierarchy

Seeing self and other formation in the context of gender hierarchy is a key step in linking ambivalent emotions to a political-economic formation – it means locating these psychoanalytic processes

in their social context, rather then seeing them simply as self-propelling processes that arise automatically from the fact of growing up as a child. We can now ask what happens with other forms of hierarchy, without assuming that these are secondary to gender in a temporal or theoretical sense.[14]

In a class and/or racial hierarchy, the basic processes of othering, with their associated emotions of desire and fear, are strongly mediated by the experience of class and racial difference. As a person encounters or simply learns about certain categories of people who are socially defined as different in important ways, s/he is likely to experience that category as a form of the other in relation to which a sense of self has always been formulated from a very early age, even if those categories of people were not part of those early processes of self formation. Othering is an ongoing process that continues into adult life as individuals struggle to balance autonomy and recognition. But it is also clear that othering and self formation are founded on early experiences which shape, partly unconsciously, the way that the ongoing process plays out. This is, in effect, the phenomenon known as displacement, by which I mean the way that early processes of self and other formation shape unconscious or subconscious processes later. Stoler's critique of easy formulations of quasi-Freudian notions of projection and displacement, applied to 'white men' or 'the West', is relevant here, because it cautions us against over-generalised applications of the idea of displacement. But it is still possible to think in terms of how the early experiences of a person – say, a white middle-class male growing up in Europe or a black working-class boy in Colombia – in terms of gaining a sense of self vis-à-vis others will set up patterns that shape how that person deals with different categories of others later in life.

My argument is that, if ambivalence is a basic feature of the emergence of self, vis-à-vis others, then one would expect some ambivalence in the way people think about and interact with those who, in the existing hierarchies of the social order, are classified as others in class or racial terms – one would expect the combination of fear or contempt, plus attraction or fascination. This ambivalence is not necessarily confined to the feelings of the dominant towards the subordinate, but can operate in the other direction too, as Fanon notes. Given the conditions in which ambivalence is formed, it would be almost bound to have sexual dimensions, even if not overtly so.

McClintock (1995: 75–131) has an excellent example of how these kinds of dynamics work, which is also useful in exploring racial aspects in the discussion of othering in a hierarchical context. She examines the well-known case of Arthur Munby, a Victorian barrister in England, who had a sexual obsession with working-class women, which he detailed at great length in his diaries. He secretly married his servant, Hannah Cullwick, and lived with her in a relationship that was both husband–wife and master–maid, replete with many ritualised erotic dramas of dominance and submission, many of which had distinctly racial overtones (e.g. Cullwick posed as a slave). McClintock points out that Freud, while he talked a lot in his letters about his own nanny, including sexual aspects of his relationship with her, does not mention the figure of the nanny in his theories about Oedipus and sexuality, despite the pervasive spread of this person throughout middle- and upper-class Europe as part of the growing institutionalisation of domestic service in the nineteenth century. Yet it seems undeniably relevant that most middle-class men (McClintock does not address the role of the nanny in girls' lives) had two mother figures, radically separated by class: the mother and the nanny. Freudian ideas about how a boy competes with the father for the mother as part of the playing out of the Oedipus complex do not really work with the nanny, who is an employee. McClintock contends that the split image of the woman as Madonna and whore, perfect and sullied, emerges from this historical reality – or more generally from the way class differences entered the domestic sphere at this time – rather than being a psychological archetype. Making recourse to what is in effect a notion of displacement, McClintock argues that:

> The class and gender contradictions of late Victorian society entered Munby's life with the force of an insoluble riddle. Mastering the riddle of doubled gender became the obsession that consumed his life. His chief

> strategy for managing the contradictions was, I suggest, the imperial discourse on race. In this respect, Munby was no eccentric, but was fully representative of his class. (McClintock 1995: 80)

The contradictions lay in the emotional and physical distance of the mother compared to the closeness of the nanny; and in the class status of the mother, compared to the clearly subordinate status of the nanny, whose word was, however, law for the child. Although McClintock does not deal with the material in exactly this way, one can certainly see the scope for complex processes of self and other formation in relation to a distant mother who is a social equal and a close nanny who is clearly defined as other in class terms. This seems especially relevant to Latin America, where domestic service is still a key institution, in which working-class women, often black, indigenous or mixed-race, work in middle- and upper-class homes (Gill 1994; Radcliffe 1990).

The tension between autonomy and dependence in this peculiarly intimate conjuncture of the class structure is complicated by the fact that the nanny mother figure, who acts as a key legitimator of the child's self and as the intimate, physically close protector in which that self can find respite, is herself *already* other in class terms to the child and the family. Ambivalence towards this other is likely to be intensified. McClintock uses the idea of 'managing' this bundle of contradictions: not resolving them, but somehow coping with them, or at least expressing them, by engaging in various strategies. For Munby, it was fetishising working-class women – and the rougher, the better for his tastes. He also masculinised them and racialised them (as black and primitive) in writing about and drawing them.

For Cullwick herself, who also left extensive diaries, McClintock's argument is similar. Cullwick chose to continue her life as a working servant even after marrying Munby: she insisted on and took pride in her labours, which she described in endless detail; she refused to be a middle-class wife. McClintock argues that Cullwick craved recognition by the upper classes, which she could achieve only through self-negation and service – and then not always, as she, like all domestic servants, was often ignored

and made invisible. If the upper classes constituted the other for her, she clearly had ambivalent feelings, craving their recognition, marrying a middle-class man, but insisting on her drudgery, which became a sexual fetish for her as it was for Munby. She stamped her working-class status upon herself, but it was also dramatised and valued by Munby's obsession. Cullwick also wore a 'slave band' (a leather wrist strap) and a padlock and chain around her neck; she blacked her face and wrote of Munby as her 'Massa'. Race served Cullwick as a means to express her subservience, which in her case was at least in part voluntary (i.e. she chose to continue as a servant): for Cullwick, too, differences of class and gender were cast in a racial idiom.

The function of racialisation in McClintock's argument is a little under-specified: 'dangerous crossings of gender and class are negotiated by projecting onto them the rhetoric of race' (1995: 108); 'class and gender distinctions were displaced and represented as natural racial differences' (ibid.: 154).[15] The implication is that this racialisation helped to mask and/or naturalise and thus legitimate distinctions of class and gender (even though gender was already seen as an essentially natural difference). McClintock also argues that fetishes, whether racial or sexual, worked by 'displacing what the modern imagination could not incorporate onto the invented domain of the primitive' (ibid.: 182). More generally, they act as a recipient into which are displaced 'contradictions' which cannot be resolved on a personal level (ibid.: 184). In McClintock's view, the modern imagination had particular trouble incorporating the simple fact of women's paid labour in a world in which the cult of domesticity defined women as purely domestic. Working women were thus subject to fetishisation as sexually and racially other: they were ambivalently loathed and desired, invisibilised and loved. This generated ambivalence among those women too.

In McClintock's argument, then, the reason why race and sex interrelate in such a close fashion is linked – rather like in Stoler's approach – to the functions empire and race played in dealing with emerging issues around class and gender in bourgeois European society. The difference from Stoler is that McClintock uses psy-

choanalytic insights to understand the generation of desire in this context, as well as focusing on the regulation of sexuality, gender and class (which is not to say that Stoler is not interested in questions of desire, as I shall show later). Processes of self formation, for the white, middle-class men on whom McClintock concentrates in this part of her book, created others in gender and class terms, who were desired and even fetishised in ways that were displaced onto a discourse of race. What McClintock does not really address, however, is that this discourse of race existed and was already sexualised by the period she is talking about. In the end, race is introduced to the argument as a secondary issue and some questions about why race and sex go together are left unanswered. The sexualisation of race cannot be seen just as the result of the displacement of specific class and gender contradictions in a nineteenth-century imperial context. It runs deeper than that.

McClintock is, however, very useful for showing how processes of self and other formation generate sexual desire in a class hierarchy. Categories that are defined as other in a concrete social context of hierarchy become targets, receptacles or conceptual spaces for the emotional and sexual ambivalences that arise from the gendered processes of self and other formation: the relationship with other, in the structural sense, shapes and is shaped by the relationships with actual others, many of whom are predefined as other by hierarchical social categorisation. In that sense, it is easy to see how a category defined as racially other could as easily get entangled in all those processes as a category defined in class terms, especially as racial otherness very often overlaps with class otherness. There is a central truth to this, in my view, yet it brings us back to our central problem, which is that, while class has undoubtedly been sexualised, as McClintock shows, there seems to be a particularly powerful affinity between race and sex, which means that to analyse race simply as a parallel case to class or as secondary adjunct to class is not sufficient. Fanon clearly recognises this, but, as we have seen, he does not explain it beyond asserting that 'in relation to the Negro everything takes place on the genital level' (1986 [1952]: 157).

Homi Bhabha, Colonialism and Ambivalence

Homi Bhabha, who draws on Fanon, make a useful intervention in this respect, in part because he is interested in psychoanalysis, but also because he focuses on the colonial (and postcolonial) racialised situation as *sui generis*, as one in which the dramas of the ambivalence and the Otherness of the Self get played out with peculiar intensity. Bhabha interrogates the phenomenon of ambivalence: this is characteristic of self formation in general, but it is especially powerful in the colonial context, with its 'extremity of ... alienation', 'its displacement of time and person, its defilement of culture and territory' and the 'peculiar visibility' of power (1994: 41, 83): 'It is not the colonialist Self or the colonised Other, but the disturbing distance in-between that constitutes the figure of colonial otherness' (ibid.: 45). Part of that distance in-between is captured by the ambivalence of desire and derision that characterises relationships between coloniser and colonised and Bhabha has a specific argument about how and why racial and sexual discourses combine to express that ambivalence. He sees a structural and functional parallel between the figure of the colonial racial stereotype and the figure of the sexual fetish, which allows the former to be read as the latter (ibid.: 74).

Following Freud, Bhabha argues that the sexual fetish is a substitute. A boy – and in Freud's theory this does apply only to boys, not girls (McClintock 1995: 190) – desires oneness with the mother, but this threatens his sexual identity as a boy, because he has seen that his mother is not a male, as she has no penis. Oneness with her would for him entail 'castration', or loss of masculine identity. A fetish is an object of (sexual) worship that substitutes for the mother, allowing desire while allaying the threat of castration. According to Bhabha, the fetish normalises the threat of sexual difference (between men and women) and the anxiety of castration. Simplifying somewhat, it is a way of engaging with sexual desire, while avoiding some of the basic realities of the differences between men and women.

The colonial racial stereotype, says Bhabha, depends on a myth of racial purity that normalises the internal diversity of a

putative racial category and presents a simple image of identity – 'whites/blacks are like *this*'. Thus both the sexual fetish and the colonial stereotype normalise difference. There is more than just a structural parallel, however, there is also a functional link: the sexual fetish 'plays' between the anxiety about sexual difference and the untroubled affirmation of no difference; the stereotype 'plays' between anxiety about racial difference and the affirmation of racial purity and unmixed origins. Thus: 'Discourses of sexuality and race relate in a process of *functional overdetermination*' (1994: 74, emphasis in original). This, then, allows Bhabha to analyse the colonial stereotype and how it operates in relation to basic processes of self and other formation that are deeply entangled in sexuality. The self emerges through the mirror phase, which gives rise to both narcissism (love of the coherent self) and aggression (towards the self as other, potentially fragmenting). This love/hate ambivalence is also found in colonial strategies of domination in which stereotypes both mask difference (narcissistically holding up an image of racial purity) and acknowledge it (aggressively pointing to racial difference) (ibid.: 77). The insecurity and ambivalence of the stereotype lead to its obsessive and endless repetition – in jokes, sayings and other iterations – and also to contradictory qualities: the black man as savage yet obedient, as sexually rampant yet child-like, as cunning yet innocent (ibid.: 82).

Bhabha's account is complex and even opaque, but stripped to its bare bones, he is saying that the ambivalences that emerge out of self and other formation become harnessed to a colonial project of racial domination and alienation in which the tense dependencies between ruler and ruled parallel the ambivalences of self and other. Race and sex fit together because they work in similar ways: this is a functional 'over-determination', not only because the basic ambivalences of self and other are transferred to the colonial situation and shape it, nor only because the colonial situation creates a fertile environment in which self/other ambivalences emerge, but because both those things happen at the same time and determine each other. One could speculate that the same thing could be true for any context of domination, such as a class

hierarchy, but, although he does not address exactly this question, Bhabha, like Fanon, does see something specific about the racial colonial situation. This lies in the *visibility* of racialisation – not a natural fact, but one in which skin is 'produced or processed as visible' (1994: 79) – which links to the 'peculiar visibility of colonial power' (ibid.: 83). Bhabha states: 'The visibility of the racial/colonial Other is at once a *point* of identity ("Look, a Negro") and at the same time a *problem* for the attempted closure within discourse' (ibid.: 81). That is, the intensely scopic nature of racial/colonial domination – its reliance on *looking* – accentuates the ambivalent nature of the stereotype, which is stretched between asserting simple racial purities and recognising the complexities of racial heterogeneity (cf. Seshadri-Crooks 2000: 1–11). Although Bhabha does not make this specific point, one could conclude that, because of this, there is a particularly intense relationship between race and sex: the ambivalences of racial/colonial domination fit particularly well with the ambivalences of sexualised, gendered processes of self-other formation.[16]

Domination, Regulation and Ambivalence: Combining Psychoanalysis and Social Science

The introduction of a psychoanalytic element is, in my view, potentially useful because it holds the promise of explaining why systems of domination seem to generate sexualised imaginaries and discourses, in which sexuality is not only an instrument of power and a target for regulation and governance, but is also involved in an ambivalent play of fear and desire, of hate and love. Psychoanalysis suggests that the process of forming a self, in a necessary but necessarily agonistic relation to others, produces ambivalence; in a situation of social hierarchy, the categories that are defined as subordinate and inferior (women, working classes, non-whites) come to occupy the position of other and become the subject of ambivalent emotions which are deeply entangled with sexuality. It is worth noting that the promise of psychoanalysis lies partly in the fact that gender difference is introduced at the very heart of the approach (which is not to say that gender is

confined to simple differences between 'men' and 'women', as feminist and queer reformulations of classic psychoanalysis have stressed): othering occurs in a gendered way right from the start and this is inherently linked to sexuality.

A second contribution of an approach open to the insights of psychoanalysis is that it may also help us to understand why *racial* domination seems to have such an elective affinity for sex: this is linked to the strong parallels between sex/gendered processes of self and other formation and racialised processes of othering, in which relations with a gendered/sexed other easily morph into relations with a racialised other, due to the role played by differences perceived, in a scopic regime, as 'natural' and embodied.

However, we need to be aware of the strong critiques to which psychoanalytic accounts of desire have been subjected – even as they have been reformulated by feminist and queer theorists. The French philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault have both, in different ways, challenged the very basis of Freudian and Lacanian approaches to understanding desire (Butler 1987: ch. 4; Campbell 2000; Young 1995: ch. 7), or pleasure to use Foucault's preferred term (see Deleuze 1994). In *Anti-Oedipus*, Deleuze and Guattari (1983) argue that Freud's Oedipus complex – which is the key to Freud's ideas about the emergence of sex/gender and desire – does exist, but only under the specific conditions of Western capitalism. It is not, as Freud implied, a universal dynamic which grows out of the basic family unit and the experience of any child in relation to its mother and father (Bertold 1998). Sexuality thus has to be seen as the 'libidinal unconscious of political economy' (Deleuze and Guattari, cited in Young 1995: 168). Freud saw sexual desire as socially constructed, through the mechanism of the Oedipus complex, but Deleuze and Guattari propose a much more radically socialised approach to desire (and not just sexual desire): the whole notion of lack, which is basic to the Lacanian notion of desire as originating in loss of primal oneness, is rejected by Deleuze and Guattari, who argue that desire-as-lack is linked to capitalism's material need for 'scarcity'. Colonialism, however, does impose the Oedipus complex as a

psychic structure on the West's colonies: 'Oedipus is always colonisation pursued by other means, it is the interior colony, and ... at home, where we Europeans are concerned, it is our intimate colonial education' (Deleuze and Guattari 1975: 173). Failure to recognise this, simply to analyse psychopathologies from the point of view of the Oedipus complex, is to make psychoanalysis itself part of the mechanisms by which capitalism and colonialism are reproduced.

Foucault also argues that desire is produced by power-laden discourses that seek to regulate it and cannot be seen as the product of universal psychic dynamics of self formation. Desire only emerges in and through discourse. Foucault takes issue with the Freudian and Lacanian notion of repression: that desire, although seen by Freud and Lacan as socially constructed and not a simple instinct, is nonetheless a product of denial, loss and repression. For Foucault, in his analysis of sexuality in modern Western society, bio-power positively *produces* desire, especially sexual desire, as a key mechanism for the production and regulation of life itself. Psychoanalysis is a discursive domain that constructs sexuality and repression as keys to modern identity and well-being; it thus produces the desires it purports to reveal. It is an object of, not a tool for, sociological and historical analysis.

Campbell (2000) argues that psychoanalytic approaches that rely on Oedipal narratives – whether in Freud, Lacan or a host of theories derived from them, including by some feminists and queer theorists – remain mired in 'a white, ethnocentric imaginary' and are 'part of a Western colonising discourse that imposes itself as a universal cultural narrative'. (It is notable that Bhabha's analysis only really applies to colonisers, not the colonised.) For Campbell, Oedipal narratives can and do operate in the West, but the unconscious may function according to other logics too.

These critiques indicate the need to be cautious with psychoanalysis and, of course, direct us back to the kinds of approaches I reviewed in the first section of this chapter, which focus on power. Yet my view is that these approaches do not get us far enough in their account of the ambivalence around sex

and race, and the role that desire plays. For example, in his book *Colonial Desire*, Robert Young, while acknowledging Bhabha, generally adopts an approach that owes little to psychoanalysis and more to theories of social power and domination. He notes that much postcolonial criticism focuses on the coloniser/colonised opposition, and less on the processes of mixture and cultural contact. He therefore proposes to use sex as a model for understanding contact and to focus on the questions of hybridity and mixedness that concerned both colonisers and colonised (1995: 5). Racism worked partly by policing the crossing of sexual boundaries: 'bastard and mixed-blood are the true names of race' (ibid.: 180, citing Deleuze and Guattari) and notes the fascination of nineteenth-century racial theory with 'a Malthusian fantasy of uncontrollable, frenetic fornication producing countless motley varieties of interbreeding' (ibid.: 181). Sexual exchange, Young says, mirrored colonial economic exchange and 'it was therefore wholly appropriate that sexual exchange, and its miscegenated product ... should become the dominant paradigm through which ... colonialism was conceived' (ibid.: 182). But, while he recognises the ambivalence of desire and fear in colonial contexts, Young never explains this, nor does he delve into why race and sex intertwine, other than to imply that if divisions of power and hierarchy exist between two categories, then any relationship across that division would be of concern – *a fortiori* a sexual one. This is crucial, to be sure, but leaves a certain amount unexplained: that sexual exchange went hand in hand with economic exchange does not really account for why sexual exchange became the 'dominant paradigm' for colonialism.

Stoler takes a more promising approach. As we have seen, she has a critical view of appropriations of Freud by historical studies, with their notions of the displacement and projection of white male anxieties onto colonial others. According to her, this actually leaves unexplained the workings of sexual desire, which figures only as a repressed biological instinct that flows in a 'hydraulic model of sexuality' and seeps or bursts out in unexpected places (1995: 173, citing Martha Vicinus). Taking a Foucauldian line,

Stoler understands colonial discourses of sexuality as 'productive of class and racial power, not mere reflections of them' (ibid.: 176). She challenges 'the story that colonialism was that quintessential project in which desire was always about sex, that sex was always about power, and that both were contingent on a particular representation of non-white women's bodies' (ibid.: 189). Sexuality in the colonies embraced a range of desires and subjects (mothers, children, maids) and had as much to say about broader moral values and propriety as it did about the direct exercise of prurient power by white men over native women. As one would expect from the Foucauldian angle, sexuality is seen as part of the overall regulation and administration of the social order in the colonies; and in this, sex was not necessarily the key aspect Foucault made it out to be. Stoler argues that relationships of affect, kinship and nurturance, which cannot be reduced to sexuality itself, were also important ties that had to be regulated (ibid.: 191).

In all this, though, the affirmation of the bourgeois self, both in Europe and in the colonies, was central and this was always 'contingent on a changing set of Others' (ibid.: 193) who acted as mirrors and mimics. 'If desire is about both externalisation and mimesis as so much of the philosophical literature on desire suggests, then no political story is more relevant to the production of western desire than colonialism' (ibid.: 192). Despite the reference to 'philosophy' rather than psychoanalysis, externalisation is also a Freudian concept (meaning projection or displacement) and Stoler is clearly saying not only that constructions of self in relation to Others were important, but that colonialism set a special stage for these processes of the 'education of desire' – that is, that race and sex intertwined in particular ways on this stage. One must agree that these processes should not be assumed to be the result of 'hydraulic' manifestations of a pre-established (male) desire, nor reduced to white male exploitation of non-white females in a straight exercise of power and domination, but this still leaves room for considering processes of self and other formation in their social context.

In some ways, this converges with McClintock's aim to 'refuse the clinical separation of psychoanalysis and history', a distinction that 'was germane to imperial modernity itself' in its opposition of the private and the public. She aims to link up family, sexuality and fantasy with labour, money and the market (1995: 8). De Lauretis (1994a) says that 'we cannot think the sexual outside of psychoanalytic categories', but she wants to combine Freud and Foucault – 'unwonted bedfellows' – in a 'theoretical articulation of Freud's psychosexual view of the internal world with Foucault's sociosexual view'. Likewise, trying to reconcile anthropology and psychoanalytic approaches, Moore sees the latter as seeking 'to understand the entrance of the human subject into the existing networks and discourses of social and cultural relations', a process that 'needs to be accounted for in historically specific ways' (2007: 44–5). Campbell (2000: ch. 8) also seeks to situate the cultural unconscious historically and socially, tracing how embodied experience in a given social context shapes the unconscious, which in turn, through its creative and representational capacities, institutes cultural myths and regimes of symbolic difference.

Conclusion

The problem with which I started – why do race and sex intertwine in contexts of domination and hierarchy? – can appear to be resolved with disarming simplicity. Sex can be used as a direct instrument of domination, of course, but more generally, if race 'stands for' hierarchical position and sexual reproduction is key to maintaining hierarchy, then the two domains will converge. Stolcke sums up with admirable clarity the 'reason race and sex as criteria of discrimination intersect':

> In fact, racialist classifications invariably entail the control of women's sexuality because ideologies of race attribute social placement in an unequal social order to heredity, that is, to genealogy. It is this genealogical thinking that endows sex with sociopolitical significance. Because the entire society is caught in this genealogical logic, for the white elites to ensure their preeminence they need to control their own women's bodies and sexuality, whereas, for example, Indian maids fall prey to white men's sexual depredations. (Stolcke 2002: 680)

Stolcke captures a central truth here, but further considerations are needed. First, there is a tendency here to start with the existence of a society stratified in terms of genealogy and then see the control of women's sexuality as a consequence of that. This tends to skate over how the society came to be stratified in genealogical terms in the first place, which must have happened partly through mechanisms of control of property and inheritance, which themselves depended on controlling (women's) marriage and reproduction.

Second, and linked to the first point, prior to the conquest of the Americas, several native American and African societies had unequal social orders, characterised by noble and aristocratic lineages, which depended in different ways on genealogy (as we shall see in the next chapter). Yet how men controlled female sexuality there was different from the situation in Europe. There was much less concern with premarital virginity, for example. In short, there are different modes of genealogical thinking, which link to stratification and to sexuality in different ways.

Third, during this pre-conquest period, Iberian and other European men were very concerned with 'their own women's bodies and sexuality' – specifically, their premarital virginity and marital fidelity – and genealogy was certainly important to the hierarchical organisation of society, but it is a very open question whether 'racialist classifications' were operating at that time. Thus 'genealogical thinking' need not be racial thinking.

Fourth, the control of sexuality invoked by Stolcke is linked directly to white elite male domination, whereas a more Foucauldian approach expands the idea of the regulation of sexuality to a broader domain in which sexuality is seen as key to the construction of a European moral order, based on twin pillars of hierarchy in Europe and in the colonies. White men are dominant in this order, but there is a broader project of moral construction at work.

Finally, this moral order is one in which selves are formed in relation to others, and in order to really explain the characteristic ambivalence of desire and fear, love and loathing – and perhaps to explain the peculiar intensity with which race and sex converge – it seems necessary to add to the picture of domination and regulation of sexuality some element of attention to processes of self and other formation, always, however, in their social context and not assumed as universal or automatic dynamics.

3

RACE AND SEX IN COLONIAL LATIN AMERICA

Introduction

If we want to understand how and why race and sex articulate with each other in the formation of colonial societies in Latin America, we have to start with an outline of sex and sexuality in both the Iberian and indigenous American social orders around the time of the conquest of the Americas, with some brief comments about West Africa too. We also need a sketch of Spanish and Portuguese thinking about the differences between themselves, indigenous peoples and Africans – thinking that we can gloss as 'racial' only once we have grasped its historical specificity.

Sex and Gender in Iberia and the Americas

Iberia at the time of the conquest formed part of what Jack Goody called Eurasian societies, which relied on plough agriculture controlled by men, had stratified systems based on the holding of landed properties, which were passed on through 'diverging devolution', a mode of inheritance that gave property both to sons and, via dowries, to daughters (Goody 1976).[1] In such systems, great importance was attached to the marriage of daughters and the legitimacy of their offspring, because these matters impinged directly on where a family's property ended up; women's sexuality was bound up with notions of virtue and premarital chastity was highly valued. These questions were of particular importance to the elite families which controlled large landed properties; plebeian families were less concerned with controlling marriages,

– although, especially in the historical period, there are fewer sources for this perspective. Speaking on behalf of 'the subaltern' is, of course, an enterprise replete with difficulties (Beverley 1999; Spivak 1988), as the attempt to do so can end in precisely the representational objectifications that were the problem in the first place. But better some attempt at this, I believe, than none at all. One can never escape one's positioning in a differentiated and unequal world. As Skeggs (2004: 118) says – in a different context – in relation to class positioning: 'To deny the existence of class, or to deny that one is middle-class, is to abdicate responsibility for the relationships in which one is repeatedly reproducing power.' But one can recognise one's positioning and adopt some strategies that work against its grain.

NOTES

1 Introduction: Defining Race and Sex

1. I hesitate to use the word 'races' or 'racial identities' for the parents' origins here, because, at least until the seventeenth century, the Spanish word *raza* – which first appears sporadically in the thirteenth century and becomes slightly more common by the sixteenth century – does not appear frequently in colonial sources, although reference may quite easily be found to what we would now call racial terms, such as *negro* (black), *indio* (indigenous person), *mulato* (the offspring of a black and a white parent), *mestizo*, and so on. Even in the late eighteenth century in Mexico, terms such as *calidad* (quality) were used to refer to these 'racial' origins (McCaa 1984).
2. Much of the work on the interrelation between race and sex is in history and cultural/literary studies, although some of the work is in interdisciplinary areas such as race studies and gender studies (Alexander 2005; Bhabha 1994; Boggs 2000; Fanon 1986 [1952]; Ferguson 2007; Gilman 1985, 1993; Hendricks and Parker 1994; Hodes 1999; JanMohamed 1990; McClintock 1995; Mosse 1985; Parker et al. 1992b; Smith 1998; Somerville 2000; Stoler 1995, 2002; Wiegman 1995; Young 1995; Zack 1997), with some work in philosophy too (Butler 1993; Fuss 1994). The mainstream social sciences have had less impact in this area, but have also contributed important material (Collins 2000; Harden 1997; Lutz and Collins 1997; Manderson and Jolly 1997b; Nagel 2003; Povinelli 1997, 2006; Ragoné and Twine 2000; Smith 1996; Williams 1996). A lot of this work has focused on the US, where the taboos and hysteria surrounding interracial sex, or 'miscegenation' as it became known from 1863, created a special context. On Latin America, Verena Martinez-Alier's pioneering study, *Marriage, Colour and Class in Nineteenth-century Cuba* (Martinez-Alier [Stolcke] 1989 [1974]), set an influential agenda concerned with how racialised status systems were mediated through patriarchal gender relations, later developed by such scholars as Carol Smith (1996) for Guatemala. More recently (but see Roger Bastide's early [1961] foray) scholars have addressed directly the relationship between race and sex: for example, Vera Kutzinski (1993) on the cult of the erotic *mulata* in Cuba, Nadine Fernandez (1996) on racialised desire and racially

mixed relationships in Cuba, Kamala Kempadoo (1999b, 2004) and Denise Brennan (2004) on sex work and sex tourism in the Caribbean, Jean Rahier (1998, 1999, 2003) on race, beauty pageants and black women in Ecuador, Peter Fry (1982, 2002) on homosexuality, race and beauty in Brazil, Donna Goldstein (1999, 2003), Amelia Simpson (1993) on the sexual and racial aspects of the Brazilian TV presenter Xuxa and – highlighting the fact that the majority of this literature focuses on the 'black–white' matrix of relations – Diane Nelson (1998, 1999) on gender and desire in Guatemalan discourses of *mestizaje*, Mary Weismantel (2001) on the racial and sexual imaginary of the Andean zone of Peru and Fiol-Matta (2002) on racial and sexual discourses in the work of the queer Chilean writer Gabriela Mistral. Within Latin America, too, there is burgeoning interest in this theme (Díaz 2006; Moutinho 2004, 2006; Moutinho et al. 2006; Viveros Vigoya 2002a, 2002b). From an historical angle, a growing literature is emerging, often focused on sexuality (and gender), but with substantial reference to race: for example, Richard Trexler's (1995) pioneering book on (homo)sexuality in indigenous American cultures before and during the conquest, Luiz Mott's (1985) work on homosexuality in colonial Brazil, Pete Sigal's (2003b) collection on colonial homosexuality in Iberian–indigenous power relations, Ramón Gutiérrez's (1991) book on colonial New Mexico, the special issue he edited of the *Journal of the History of Sexuality*, 16(3), 2007, Sueann Caulfield's (1997, 2003) research on Brazil, Laura Briggs (2002) and Eileen Suárez Findlay (1998) on Puerto Rico, James Green (1999, 2006) on homosexuality in Brazil and Peter Beattie's (2001) on the army and masculinity in Brazil. Many other historical works on gender and sexuality mention race or race mixture, without this being a central theme (e.g. Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera 1998a; Rosemblatt 2000; Twinam 1999); an influential collection on sexuality in the region (Balderston and Guy 1997) has only a couple of discussions of race (by James Green and Sueann Caulfield) and Caulfield's (2001) review of historical work on gender mentions race only a handful of times; a more recent collection on gender and sexuality (French and Bliss 2006) has only one chapter that really analyses race and sexuality (by James Green), while others mention it more in passing (e.g. Lara Putnam and Alejandra Bronfman). Many texts addressing the issue of *mestizaje* inevitably touch on the intersection of race and gender – and, by implication, sex – without making sex and race the focus of their analysis (Mörner 1967; Stepan 1991).

3. Thus, for example, in the late 1700s, the German medic Johann Friedrich Blumenbach divided the human species into five races: the Negroid, or black race; the Caucasian race or white race; the American or red race; the Mongolian or yellow race; and the Malayan or brown race (which included the Oceanic and Australasian peoples). In a similar manner, the US Bureau of the Census uses a racial classification based on five categories: Black or African American; White; American Indian or Alaska Native; Asian; Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander. A version of these categories also appears in recent genetics – for example, in the DNA ancestry tests offered by DNAPrint, which offers to 'determine with confidence to which of the major bio-geographical ancestry groups, Sub-Saharan African, European, East Asian or Native American, a person belongs, as well as the relative percentages in cases of admixed peoples' (www.dnaprint.com/welcome/productsandservices/anestrybydna/, accessed 18 December 2008).
4. So, for example, eighteenth-century Western thinking saw human nature as relatively plastic compared to the scientific view of human nature as rather fixed that dominated for most of the twentieth century, until its last decades, when genomics and biotechnology combined to unsettle more deterministic ideas of nature, which, in any case, had arguably never held full sway in lay circles (Wade 2002).
5. All references to the *OED* are taken from its online edition at http://dictionary.oed.com/ (accessed January 2008).
6. The term 'queer theory' was coined by Teresa de Lauretis (1991) to describe current attempts to theorise diverse sexualities, especially gay and lesbian, and to analyse and challenge heteronormativity and heterosexism, usually in the West. De Lauretis (1994a) later cautioned that the term had 'quickly become a conceptually vacuous creature of the publishing industry'. It is now often taken to be an approach that challenges many kinds of normative identity categories, although still usually in relation to sexuality and gender (see also Butler 1993; Warner 1999; Weed and Schor 1997).
7. Stanton (1995: 18) states that 'Catherine A. McKinnon privileged sexuality instead of gender, as the "social process which creates, organizes, expresses, and directs desire, creating the social beings we know as women and men".'
8. Nagel (2003: 8), for example, defines sexuality as relating to 'sexual' practices and attitudes, without defining what sexual means. Stanton (1995: 4) says that sexuality is an 'unstable category' and, doubtless as a result, does not define it. Parker et al. (1992a) also use the term without definition. Di Leonardo and Lancaster (1997: 1) define sexuality in relation to 'gendered, sexual bodies'.
9. Sigal (2003a: 9) at first goes in circles, defining sexual desire in terms of their relation to sexual acts. But he admits that 'The line between

what is sexual and what is not sexual is by no means obvious', and ends by defining the sexual in relation to a series of specific acts which he argues are universally assigned sexual meanings, viz. vaginal intercourse, sodomy and possibly also oral sex, sex acts between women and rape. There is still an evident circularity here (which acts between women are sex acts?) that seems impossible to avoid.

2 Explaining the Articulation of Race and Sex

1. Stoler (1995: 124) notes that 'From Montaigne to Mayhew and Balzac ... imperial images of the colonized native American, African, and Asian as eroticized savage or barbarian saturated the discourses of class'. More specifically, various authors (e.g. Clark and Nagel 2000; Godbeer 1999; Nagel 2003: 78–83; Robe 1972: 50–1; Spear 1999) show that native North American men and women were sexualised and others (Boesten 2008; De la Cadena 2000: ch. 4; Lewis 2003: ch. 5; McClintock 1995: 25–6; Nelson 1999: ch. 6; Silverblatt 2004: 161–86; Weismantel 2001) indicate that the same was true for native South American women, although sometimes this is more true of women who are perceived as slightly distanced from indigenousness, who may be labelled *cholas*. There is some evidence on this issue for native South American men, even though indigenous men are often seen as feminised or asexual (Canessa 2008; Nelson 1999: 218).
2. See also hooks (1981) and Wallace (1979).
3. Stuart Hall has developed the concept of articulation (see Grossberg 1986).
4. This view of rape, as being more about power than sex, was made popular especially by Susan Brownmiller (1975) and Angela Davis (1981). Empirical research with rapists has offered some support for this view (Groth 1979).
5. Such constructions of Otherness can be traced across a variety of contexts, from the idea of the Wild Man, which dates back to ancient times, to ideas about the healing magic of Amazonian indigenous peoples (Dudley and Novak 1972; Taussig 1987).
6. The 'postural schema' (or corporeal schema) is a term used in phenomenology (e.g. by Merleau-Ponty) to mean the lived experience of bodily spatiality or the embodied way in which the subject is articulated in the world.
7. Doane notes that Freud argued that 'civilization is born at the expense of sexuality' (1991: 211). That is, civilisation is achieved through the repression of sexuality: 'Civilization behaves toward sexuality as a people or a stratum of its population does which has subjected another one to its exploitation' (Freud, cited by Gates 1991: 466).
8. Fanon has a third explanation, which is that the white man realises he has treated the black man badly and sees the resulting black aggression as justified; he then unconsciously legitimates this aggression by masochistically turning it on himself, scaring himself with fantasies about black men's sexual prowess or indulging in plays of racialised subordination and dominance: 'There are men who go to "houses" in order to be beaten by Negroes; passive homosexuals who insist on black partners' (Fanon 1986 [1952]: 177).
9. Various scholars critique Fanon's gender and sexual politics (Campbell 2000: ch. 7; Doane 1991: 209–48; Fuss 1994; Hall 1996; Young 1996); while Bhahba (1986) tries to add ambivalence to Fanon's account.
10. Moore (1994: 42–8) argues that, in grasping processes of self formation, Lacanian approaches provide a more cross-culturally open framework than some other psychoanalytic approaches derived from Freud, Melanie Klein and object-relations theory.
11. On Lacanian ideas of desire, see Butler (1987: ch. 4), Van Zyl (1998), Campbell (2000: chs 3 and 4) and Moore (2007: 50–5). See also De Lauretis (1994a, 1994b). On the Lacanian distinction between 'other' and 'Other', see Fuss (1994: 21).
12. Benjamin (1998: 79) states: 'The ego is not really independent and self-constituting, but is actually made up of the objects it assimilates; the ego cannot leave the other to be an independent outside entity, separate from itself, because it is always incorporating the other, or demanding that the other be like the self ... the self is constituted by the identifications with the other that it deploys in an on-going way, in particular to deny the loss and uncontrollability that otherness necessarily brings ... [and] it is reciprocally constituted in relation to the other, depending on the other's recognition, which it cannot have without being negated, acted on by the other.' See also Benjamin (1988).
13. Key figures in this literature are Hélène Cixous, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Juliet Mitchell, Jessica Benjamin, Judith Butler, Teresa de Lauretis, Eve Sedgwick, Elizabeth Grosz and Nancy Chodorow (see e.g. Benjamin 1998; Butler 1990, 1993; Chodorow 1978; De Lauretis 1994b; Grosz 1994; Lacan et al. 1982; Mitchell 1974). For overviews, see Campbell (2000), Dean and Lane (2001) and Minsky (1996).
14. As Moore (2007: 124) says: 'The earliest representations of significant others are caught up with forms of gender difference that have no realisable expression outside their relations with other forms of

difference, such as race, class and ethnicity.' Seshadri-Crooks (2000: 6–7) has a different Lacanian argument in which sexual difference is built on lack and the failure of Oneness, while race – which is not analogous to sexual difference, but must be read in relation to it – is the opposite: 'The signifier Whiteness tries to fill the constitutive lack of the sexed subject. It promises a totality, an overcoming of difference itself.'

15. Compare Toni Morrison, who has a similar thesis about how the African American population of the US acted as a set of 'surrogate selves' which could be used, at least in the writerly imagination, 'for meditation on problems of human freedom, its lure and elusiveness' and 'for meditations on terror – the terror of European outcasts, their dread of failure, powerlessness, Nature without limits ... evil, sin greed' (1993: 37–8).
16. Van Zyl (1998) has a simpler explanation, based on Freud and presented in a critique of Bhabha, whom she chastises for generalising Freud's very specific ideas about sexual fetishism (which were about the obsession of a specific individual with a specific item, generated by the way the Oedipal dynamics of family relationships worked themselves out in a given case) to the much broader case of the colonial stereotype. I think Bhabha's overall point, that there is a parallel between the way sexual and racial othering function, can still stand and is in fact complemented by Van Zyl. She argues that, in Freudian theories of the Oedipus complex, a male child is taught that he must identify with the male and desire the female, while the female child is taught the opposite. Very simply, the desirable is socially defined as the gendered other – a category defined centrally by appearance. Difference is thus desirable, but also threatening, because it menaces identification, which must occur with a category defined as the same. By extension: 'The colonial preoccupation with bodily difference and the complex play of desiring and phobic relations manifest in colonial writing can both ... be explained in terms of an account of Freud's Oedipus' (1998: 97). This is substantially the same argument as Bhabha, albeit phrased in a rather different way: processes of sexual self formation parallel processes of colonial othering.

3 Race and Sex in Colonial Latin America

1. Goody has been criticised for the overly broad concept of Eurasian societies and for positing mechanical connections between technology, inheritance and kinship, but his outline of the basic complex of interrelated elements is helpful for sketching the Iberian case.

2. The terms 'sexual' and 'sexuality' did not exist at the time and 'sex' was used in the context of making categorical distinctions between men and women. Judging from Spanish colonial usage, a range of terms was used to refer to sexual acts, statuses and feelings, such as *honor* (honour, as in 'he took my honour'), *virtud* (virtue), *verguenza* (shame and, by extension, 'shameful' sexual acts; *las verguenzas*, or *as vergonhas* in Portuguese, meant the female genitalia), *vida conyugal* (married [sex] life), *concubinato* (concubinage), *estupro* (rape, or sexual access to a virgin achieved through deception), *lujuria* (lust), *fuego libidinoso* (libidinous fire), *acto carnal* (carnal act), *sodomia* (anal sex, also called the *pecado nefando*, the nefarious sin; the term was also used to describe sex between two women). See, for example, Lavrin (1989a).
3. Mott notes that the belief that Italy was the capital of sodomy 'permeated the Iberian imaginary' (2003: 173).
4. Napolitano (2004) and Bellini (1989) discuss how the Portuguese Inquisition in Pernambuco, Brazil, dealt with cases of female 'sodomy' from 1591 until 1640, when the act was deemed no longer to come within Inquisitorial jurisdiction. It then remained more or less officially invisible until the nineteenth century in Brazil (Napolitano 2008 [2004]). Napolitano and Bellini both argue that there was doubt about whether women could really commit sodomy (and above all 'perfect sodomy', which involved ejaculating semen into the anal cavity and thus wasting it for reproductive purposes) and that sexual acts between women were often seen as adolescent experimentation which, above all, did not threaten a virgin's honour: for these reasons, it was not deemed a matter of great concern. See also Tortorici (2007) and Vainfas (1989: 274–84).
5. Trexler has been criticised for over-generalising about native American homosexual practices on the basis of spotty evidence, which is sometimes taken out of context, and for oversimplifying the relationship between power and sex, reducing all homosexual practices to ones of domination: 'Trexler seems more bent on establishing the "inherent" connection between intercourse and rape than on examining the evidence' (Nesvig 2001: 699). Yet the idea of extending gender hierarchy to understanding male–male relations and of linking sex to power is undeniably a powerful one.
6. Berdache is a European term, in use from the sixteenth century, derived from the Arabic term for a boy prostitute. It has been used generically to refer to many different native American practices in which a person of one anatomical sex (usually, but not always male) assumes the gender roles of the opposite sex. Many native Americans reject the word as pejorative, preferring the term 'two-spirit people'.